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MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION: PAPERWORK
AND PROHIBITIONS PROVE
INSUFFICIENT-IS IT TIME FOR
SIMPLIFICATION AND INCENTIVES?
Robert G. Boehmer*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Racial discrimination in United States mortgage lending has, for
far too long, burdened both those subjected to it and the society'

which must accept its inevitable and negative consequences. 2 Such
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Terry College of Business, University of
Georgia. B.S., University of Oregon School of Business, 1974; J.D., University of Oregon
School of Law, 1977.
1. See generally Mortgage Discrimination: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
and Regulatory Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Mortgage Discrimination Hearings II] (statement of Sen.
Dixon, Chairman of the Subcommittee, opening the hearing) ("I was greatly troubled by the
statistics which showed that blacks in minority neighborhoods got fewer loans and got
rejected for loans more often than whites in white neighborhoods, even when incomes were
comparable."); Discrimination in Home Mortgage Lending: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1989) [hereinafter Mortgage Discrimination Hearings 11
(statement of Sen. Dixon, opening the hearing) ('I]t's 21 years since passage of the Fair
Housing Act. Fifteen years since the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was passed in the Congress; and 11 years since the Community Reinvestment Act became the law of this land, and
still we have discrimination in lending."); Dan Gillmor & Stephen K. Doig, Segregation
Forever?, AMI. DEMOGRAPHICS, Jan. 1992, at 48, 48 ("More than 25 years have passed since
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed racial discrimination in housing. Yet data from the
1990 census show black-white segregation is still a fact of life in America.").
2. Jane McGrew et al., Fair Housing: An Agenda for the Washington Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights, 27 HOW. L.J. 1291, 1304-06 (1984). McGrew found that:
As of the late 1960's and through the mid 1970's, redlining was indisputably a common, if not universal, practice among lending institutions in urban areas
of the country. Lenders attempted to justify their actions as being a necessary part
of their fiduciary obligation to depositors to minimize risk. While lenders claimed
that redlining occurred only after a neighborhood had already begun to decline,
redlining came to be recognized as a major cause of urban neighborhood decline,
as well as an effect. The refusal of lenders to invest in redlined neighborhoods has
been found to contribute to a pattern of decline, including the inability of owners
to maintain their property, the transformation of neighborhoods from owner-occupied areas to rental areas, and intensified segregation. In addition, when loans are
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discrimination has long been prohibited by federal law Despite that
prohibition, expanded Home Mortgage Disclosure Act4 (the
"HMDA") data released in 1991 and 1992' evidence a continued and
shocking disparity between the rate of home loan approval for Caucasian as compared to black applicants.6
A great deal of debate has taken place concerning the reasons
for this disparity, 7 Some have claimed that racial discrimina-

tion-whether intentional or unintentional-based on mistaken assumptions by lenders about particular categories of borrowers8 is a
major contributing factor. Others claim that the disparity may result
principally from application of sound lending standards.9 In either

case, the existence of a wide racial gap in home loan approval rates
is indisputable.1 0

When this long-standing prohibition of mortgage discrimination is
viewed alongside a continued pattern of racial disparity in loan approval rates, the conclusion is compelled that it is time for a new
approach. This approach should not water down the existing law but
should recognize that, to the extent the law is so complex that it
cannot be readily understood by those regulated, it is more likely to
foster litigation than to achieve its goals. This fresh approach should
further recognize that to the extent that a law contains inconsistencies
and unnecessarily burdensome regulatory requirements," those regumade on onerous terms, the incidence of default is likely to rise, thus increasing
the likelihood of abandonment.
The extent to which redlining is still a major problem in urban areas is not
clear.
Id. (citations omitted). It is not the purpose of this Article to resolve the question of the
relationship between the failure of lenders to lend in low income areas and the deterioration
of those areas. The debate over which of those two phenomena is the cause and which is
the effect is "not likely ever to be conclusively resolved." Robert C. Art, Social Responsibili.
ty in Bank Credit Decisions: The Community Reinvestment Act One Decade Later, 18 PAC.
L.. 1071, 1081 (1987).
3. See infra notes 18-284 and accompanying text (summarizing the federal statutes
regulating mortgage discrimination); see generally PAUL H. SCHIEBER & DENNIS REPLANSKY,
LENDERS' GUIDE TO CONSUMER COMPLIANCE AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1991)
(providing a summary of these laws).
4. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
5. See infra notes 336-78 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 338 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 358-59 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 349 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 338, 353-55 and accompanying text.
11. The Internal Revenue Code may be an example of a law with a laudatory purpose,
raising revenue for public causes, which has become so inconsistent and burdensome that
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lated are less likely to comply voluntarily.
Perhaps the current fury about the overall regulatory burden on
financial institutions12 provides a realistic opportunity to adopt a new
approach. Specifically, this Article argues that a significant reduction
in the "paperwork" associated with this regulatory structure, combined
with vigorous enforcement of existing law and the creation of significant incentives for lenders to invest in distressed areas of their communities has the potential to have a profound impact on the existing
pattern of mortgage discrimination. This solution may be one capable
of surviving the legislative process because it contains attractive features both for lenders and for those suffering from discrimination.
II.

SCOPE OF ARTICLE

This Article first summarizes the panoply of federal statutes and
administrative regulations designed to reverse the pattern of mortgage
discrimination in the United States. Although the focus of this Article
is upon race-based mortgage discrimination, an incomplete and inaccurate picture of the law concerning mortgage discrimination is created if other prohibited reasons for discrimination, such as disability,
are not taken into account. This section of the Article demonstrates
that these laws have focused on a two-pronged approach to the problem: prohibition and record-keeping. This section also describes the
often confusing and inconsistent standards created by that approach,
which may well be one significant factor contributing to the continued pattern of discrimination.
A number of these federal statutes and regulations were amended
as a result of passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 198913 (the "FIRREA"), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 19914 (the "FDICIA"),
and the Housing and Community Development Act of 199215 (the
16
"HCDA"). Accordingly, this Article discusses the FIRREA,

those subject to it often concentrate their efforts more on avoidance than compliance.
12. See infra notes 379-401 and accompanying text.
13. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
14. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
15. Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992).
16. For discussion of the Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989 (the "FIRREA"), see Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, A Decade's Journey from
"Deregulation" to "Supervisory Regulation": The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1103 (1990); Alvin C. Harrell, Impact of FIRREA
on Consumer Financial Services, 45 Bus. LAW. 1939 (1990); Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to
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FDICIA,"7 and HCDA in order to illustrate the concern of Congress
about mortgage discrimination and the complexity of the structure
which Congress has created to address the problem. Further, significant legislative proposals made in 1992 are analyzed. These proposals
provide significant insight into predicting statutory changes likely to
meet with success in the near future.
This Article next discusses the extent of the disparity in mortgage lending rates in the Unites States based on 1990 and 1991
HMDA data released to the public by the Federal Reserve Board (the
"FRB") in 1991 and 1992. Those FRB reports were based upon extensive data submitted by financial institutions and other mortgage
lenders throughout the United States as required by the HMDA.
HMDA reporting is just one of the many requirements imposed
on United States financial institutions by a complex, and often inconsistent, series of federal laws and regulations. Accordingly, this Article examines the extent of that regulatory burden. Given the pervasive
nature of that regulatory structure and the enormous amount of money
being expended to comply with its requirements, this section of the
Article questions the cost-effectiveness of the current approach, and
argues that the desire for alleviation of this burden may provide an
opportunity to achieve an improvement in mortgage discrimination
laws.
Finally, this Article proposes a legislative approach intended to
address this continuing problem of mortgage discrimination. This
approach has the following key elements: first, leave in place and
vigorously enforce the existing statutory prohibitions against discrimination, while requiring regulatory changes to ensure clarity and consistent application; second, simplify existing reporting requirements,
while broadening the scope of data collected, to enable meaningful
conclusions to be drawn from the data; third, create a system of
tangible reward and penalty for lenders meeting and failing to meet
Fear but FIRREA Itself Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank
Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117 (1989).

17. On the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (the
"FDICIA"), see Robert E. Barnett, FDICIA-Hardly a "Narrow" Act. BANKERS MAG., JulyAug. 1992, at 53; FDICIA Regulations-The Dam Has Burst, FIN. REG. REP., Sept. 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FRR File; House Banking Committee's Summary of
Provisions of Banking Bill (S 543) as Passed by Congress, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES,
Dec. 5, 1991, at M-1; Stephen K. Huber, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 109 BANKING LJ. 300 (1992); Cantwell F. Muckenfuss, III et al.,
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991: A Summary Overview
of Key Provisions, MAG. OF BANK MGMT., Jan. 1992, at 37.
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community reinvestment standards; fourth, fund an incentive-based
system rewarding lenders who engage in significant mortgage lending
in economically distressed areas; and fifth, require consistency among

various administrative agencies in their promulgation of regulations
applicable to regulated lenders.
III.

FEDERAL MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION STATUTES

A.

The Fair Housing Act

1. Applicability to Mortgage Discrimination

Section 805 of the Fair Housing Act"8 (the "FHA") prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,

familial status, or national origin in certain mortgage transactions. t9
Discrimination in mortgage lending which violates the FHA will often

violate 42 U.S.C. § 198120 and § 19822 (commonly known as the
Civil Rights Act of 1866) as well. 22
2. Which Lenders Are Regulated?
Any person whose business includes engaging in "residential real
estate-related transactions" is subject to § 805 of the FHA.2 However, a pattern emerges here which is a central theme throughout the

enforcement structure of the fair lending laws. Specifically, enforcement responsibility is scattered among numerous federal agencies.
18. Title VI1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 805, 82 Stat. 73,
83-84 (1968) (commonly known as the Fair Housing Act (the 'FHA"), which prohibits
discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions). In 1974, the FHA was amended
to add sex as a prohibited basis of discrimination. Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 527(b)(2), 88 Stat. 633, 728-29 (1974). The FHA was again
amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(c), 102
Stat. 1619, 1622 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1988)). These amendments expanded the coverage of the FHA by expanding the definition of "residential real
estate-related transaction" adding handicap and familial status as prohibited reasons to discriminate, expanding the damages recoverable for violations of the FHA, establishing an
administrative law judge system with power to award broad relief, and broadening the
attorney's fees provisions of the FHA. See Gary L. Jewel, The Fair Housing Act Amendments
of 1988: More Powerful and Easier to Use (for Complainants), ABA BANK COMPLIANCE,
January/Winter 1992, at 25, 25; see also Warren L. Dennis, The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988: A New Source of Lender Liability, 106 BANKING L.J. 405 (1989); Joseph D.
Rich, Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, as -Amended, by the Department of Justice, 46
Bus. LAW. 1335 (1991).

19. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1988).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
21. § 1982.
22. See S. REP. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1991).

23. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
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For example, the government agency responsible for supervision
of a particular lender's compliance with the FHA depends upon the

identity of the lender. Regulations of the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (the "OCC") apply to national banks and banks locat-

ed in the District of Columbia,24 regulations of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC") apply to state banks which are
not members of the Federal Reserve system, 5 regulations of the Na-

tional Credit Union Administration (the "NCUA") implement the FHA
for credit unions, 26 regulations of the Office of Thrift Supervision
(the "OTS") apply to savings banks,27 and rules of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") must be consulted con-

cerning the advertising aspects of the FHA for all of these lenders. 28
3. What Activity Is Prohibited or Required?
Many federally regulated lenders must consider two separate
aspects of the FHA: prohibition of discrimination and compliance

with the monitoring requirements of the appropriate supervisory agency. First, § 805 of the FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, and national origin.29 Second, although the FHA does not expressly require lenders

to maintain loan application registers ("LARs") to evidence their
compliance with FHA requirements, a number of the supervisory
agencies have determined that the maintenance of data in this format

is necessary to enable them to effectively enforce the FHA. For example, this is required for national banks by the regulations of the
OCC, 0 for state non-member banks by regulations of the FDIC, 1
and for savings associations by the regulations of the OTS.

2

24. Fair Housing Home Loan Data System, 12 C.F.R. §§ 27.1-.7 (1992).
25. Fair Housing Regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 338.1-.9 (1992). The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC") proposed amendments to these regulations on May 8,
1991 to bring them into conformity with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (the "HMDA")
as amended by the FIRREA. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,335 (1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
338); see generally Fair Housing Regulations Amended, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, Oct. 1991,
at 2 (summarizing the proposed amendments). These proposed regulations, as modified during
the comment period, became final on October 3. 1991. 56 Fed. Reg. 50.034 (1991) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 338).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 701.31 (1992).
27. 12 C.F.R. §§ 528.1-.6, .8, 571.24 (1992).
28. Fair Housing Advertising, 24 C.F.R. pt. 109 (1992).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
30. 12 C.F.R. §§ 27.3-.4 (1992).
31. Id. §§ 338.5-.9.
32. Id. § 528.6.
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The interplay between these fair housing LARs and related aspects of other federal laws is an apt example of the complex and
confusing regulatory structure which characterizes the federal fair
housing laws. For example, in addition to providing the supervisory
agencies with data to facilitate their responsibility to monitor compliance with the FHA, these LARs serve a separate function. Regulation
B33 ("Reg. B") of the FRB, adopted to implement the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act34 (the "ECOA"), does require that lenders maintain
records (although Reg. B does not require those records to be in log
sheet format) concerning certain loan applications to enable the supervisory agencies to monitor compliance with the ECOA.35 Reg. B,
however, allows those agencies to adopt a substitute monitoring program. 36 Accordingly, the fair housing LAR regulations of the OCC,
FDIC, and OTS serve the dual function of monitoring compliance
with the FHA and the ECOA.37
Designing a loan application register which serves a dual function does not, however, go far enough to meet the compliance needs
of many lenders. The HMDA and Regulation C38 ("Reg. C") of the
FRB require the collection of data in log sheet format concerning
certain loan applications, originations and purchases. 39 Due to inconsistencies between Reg. C and the fair housing regulations, many
lenders have been forced to maintain two separate log sheets. 4t
The FDIC proposed regulations in the spring of 1991 to deal
with these overlapping requirements, 4' which became final in the fall
of 1991.42 These regulations largely solve this aspect of the LAR
problem for state nonmember banks. They are designed to allow the
state member bank, in one LAR, to simultaneously comply with the
monitoring requirements
of the FHA, the ECOA, and Reg. B, and the
43
HMDA and Reg. C.
The match between these log sheets is not perfect, however.
First, some banks are exempt under the HMDA's thirty million dollar

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Equal Credit Opportunity, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1992).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 12 C.F.R. § 203 (1992).
See infra notes 115-40 and accompanying text.
Fair Housing Regulations Amended, supra note 25, at 2.
56 Fed. Reg. 21,335 (1991).
Id. at 50,034.
Id.
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exemption from collecting data concerning the race, national origin,
sex and income of applicants and borrowers.' However, there is no
corresponding exemption under the FDIC's fair housing regulations.
Thus, in order to take advantage of the new combined LAR procedures, a bank in this situation must forego the benefit of the HMDA
exemption."a Second, the timeliness requirements of the new FDIC
fair housing regulations are more stringent than Reg. C. The FDIC's
fair housing regulations require the LARs to be kept current within
thirty days of the loan disposition date.4 6 Reg. C has no similar
timeliness requirement. Once again, the lender must meet the more
stringent standard under the FDIC's fair housing regulations in order
to take advantage of the new combined LAR procedures. 47 Third,
'4
the relationship between these LARs, the broad new "geocoding 1
policy under the Community Reinvestment Act,49 and the broad new
small business and farm loan reporting provisions of FDICIA is not
fully resolved. 0
4. What Are the Remedies for Failure to Comply?
A person who believes that their rights under the FHA have
been violated may file a complaint with HUD.5' Additionally, the
Secretary of HUD may, on the Secretary's own motion, decide to file
such a complaint.5 2 The filing of the complaint generally leads to
either a dismissal of the complaint, 3 a conciliation agreement, 4 or
the filing of a charge by HUD." If HUD files a charge, this charge will be heard by an administrative law judge,5 6 unless one of the parties chooses to transfer the
matter to a federal district court.5 7 The award may include actual
damages, injunctive or other equitable relief, a civil penalty, 58 and/or

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
56 Fed. Reg. 50,034.
Id. at 50,034-35.
See id. at 50.036.
See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
See infra note 230 and accompanying text.

51. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988).
52. Id.

53. Id. § 3610(g)(3).
54. Id. § 3610(b)(2).
55. Id. § 3610(g)(2)(A).
56. Id. § 3612(b).
57. Id. § 3612(a).
58. Id. § 3612(g)(3).
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reasonable attorney's fees.5 9

The FHA also permits a private action by an aggrieved per-

son." The award in a private action may include actual and punitive
damages, injunctive or other equitable relief,61 and/or attorney's
fees. 62
The United States Department of Justice may also decide to
bring an action in federal district court. This may be done when the
Justice Department determines that there is a pattern or practice of
discrimination.63 In such a case, the court may award injunctive or66
6s a civil penalty,
other equitable relief,64 monetary damages,

and/or attorney's fees. 67
B.

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act

1. Applicability to Mortgage Discrimination
The ECOA, which is implemented by Reg. B61 of the FRB, has
a much broader scope than the FHA. The ECOA applies to a wider
range of creditors, a wider range of credit transactions, and contains a

more expansive list of prohibited reasons for discrimination. The
ECOA prohibits any discrimination 69 by a person who regularly ex-

tends credit on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
marital status, age (if the applicant has contractual capacity), receipt
of public assistance income, or the good faith exercise of rights under

59. Id. § 3612(p).
60. Id. § 3613(a)(1)(A).
61. Id. § 3613(c)(1).
62. Id. § 3613(c)(2).
63. Id. § 3614(a).
64. Id. § 3614(d)(1)(A).
65. Id. § 3614(d)(1)(B).
66. Id. § 3614(d)(1)(C).
67. Id. § 3614(d)(2).
68. 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 (1992). In addition to Reg. B, the Federal Reserve Board (the
"FRB") has published and periodically updates official staff commentary to the Regulation.
See, e.g., id. The official commentary was recently revised to deal with a conflict between
the ECOA and the HMDA, which is implemented by Reg. C of the FRB. 57 Fed. Reg.
12,202 (1992); see generally Revisions to Reg B Commentary Adopted, ABA BANK
COMPLIANCE, May 1992, at 4.
69. Reg. B defines the term "discriminate" to mean treating an applicant less favorably
than other applicants. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(n). Such discrimination is prohibited at all stages of
the credit process. Id. § 202.4. This prohibition is further implemented by the specific rules
concerning taking applications, id. § 202.5. evaluation of applications, id. § 202.6, and the
actual extension of credit, id. § 202.7. There is an exception to this nondiscrimination rule
applicable to special purpose credit programs. Id. § 202.8 (as authorized by 15 U.S.C.

§ 1691(c)).
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the Consumer Credit Protection Act.7"
2. What Lenders Are Regulated?
The ECOA applies to any person who regularly extends credit. 71 It is not limited to consumer transactions, despite the fact that
the location of its codification causes it to be commonly described as

a "consumer protection" statute. Although some of its provisions con-

cerning notice72 and record retention 73 are applied in a different
fashion when a business credit transaction is involved, discrimination
in business credit is also prohibited.74

3. What Activity Is Required or Prohibited?
The ECOA has several separate functions. First, it prohibits dis-

crimination.75 In testing whether the prohibited discrimination has
occurred, the' 76intent of the lender is not the determining factor. The

"effects test

applies, with the result that a credit policy which has

the effect of discriminating against a protected person is prohibited
even if it is unintentional.77
Second, the ECOA requires a creditor to notify each applicant7
who has submitted a completed application 79 for credit of its action

70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1988). The central provision of the ECOA, the discrimination prohibition, is located at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). Further, 12 C.F.R. § 202.4 specifies
that a creditor shall not discriminate on a "prohibited basis." Section 202.2(z) defines "prohibited basis." Familial status and handicap, which are prohibited bases for discrimination under
the FHA, are not covered by the ECOA.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e) and 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(t) define the operative term "creditor"
in this manner. "Credit" is defined at 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(d) and 12 C.F.R. § 202.20).
72. Reg. B contains special rules applicable to notifications in connection with business
credit. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(3).
73. Id. § 202.12(b)(5).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a)(2) authorizes the FRB to exempt business credit from the
provisions of the ECOA. "Business credit" is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(g). See generally
Nessa E. Feddis, A Detailed Look at Reg B Changes, ABA BANKING J., Apr. 1990, at 36;
Dolores S. Smith, The ECOA and Business Credit, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, Jan./Winter
1990. at 31.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70; 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). For particular
activities not constituting discrimination, see id. § 1691(b). For rules concerning the effect of
other laws, such as state community property laws, on this general rule prohibiting discrimination, see id. § 1691(d).
76. See, e.g., Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 481 F. Supp. 727, 731-32 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
77. See S. REP. NO. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
78. "Applicant" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) and 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e).
79. "Application" and "completed application" are defined in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(f).
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on the application.8" If "adverse action ''81 is taken, the applicant
must receive notice.
Third, the ECOA applies special rules when credit information is
furnished for an account upon which both spouses participate. Specifically, the credit information must be reported in the names of both
83
spouses.
Fourth, the creditor must satisfy the record retention requirements
of the ECOA. As a general rule, a creditor must retain records for
twenty-five months in order to comply with the ECOA. 84 However,
there are shortened time limits applicable to business credit."
Finally, Reg. B requires creditors to collect certain data about
applicants for home loans to enable supervisory agencies to monitor
compliance by the creditors with ECOA.8 6 Reg. B allows those supervisory agencies to adopt their own monitoring programs as a substitute for ECOA monitoring programs.87 A number of these supervisory agencies have adopted substitute monitoring programs.88
These substitute monitoring programs serve the dual purpose of
enabling the supervisory agency to monitor compliance with the
ECOA as well as the FHA. However, those substitute monitoring
programs have often been inconsistent with the HMDA data collection
requirements, creating uncertainty and enormous regulatory burdens
for the regulated lenders. 89
4. What Are the Remedies ,for Failure to Comply?
The ECOA contains provisions authorizing a wide range of private and governmental relief for ECOA violations. Private actions,
commenced either by the individual aggrieved party or as a class

80. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(1).
81. "Adverse action" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6) and 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(1). For the revised rules applicable to
"business credit," see id. § 202.9(a)(3).
83. 12 C.F.R. § 202.10(b).
84. Id. § 202.12(b)(I)-(3).
85. Id. § 202.12(b)(5).
86. Id. § 202.13(a)-(c).
87. Id. § 202.13(d).

88. In the case of national banks, the Fair Housing Home Loan Data System is a
substitute monitoring system. 12 C.F.R. § 27.6 (1992). The information collected by state
non-member banks under the FDIC's Fair Housing regulations is a substitute monitoring

system. Id. § 338.5. In the case of savings associations, the monitoring system under § 528.6
is used by the Office of Thrift Supervision to monitor compliance with ECOA. Id. § 528.6
(Paperwork Reduction Act Notice).
89. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
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action, are authorized.9" In addition to actual damages, an award of
punitive damages is authorized,91 equitable and declaratory relief

may be granted,92 and the plaintiff may recover costs and reasonable
attorney's fees.93
In addition to these private remedies, the appropriate supervisory

agencies94 may refer the matter to the United States Attorney General to institute a civil action. 95 The United States Attorney General

may also commence an action when there is reason to believe that
there is a'pattern or practice of violations of the ECOA by a particular creditor or group of creditors.96
C. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
proposed, contained provisions designed to
drawn about disinvestment.98 Specifically,
and purpose in the original proposal would

of 1975, 97 as originally
enable conclusions to be
the statement of finding
have made specific refer-

ence to the provision of home loans in areas from which deposits had
been received,9 9 and the proposal would have required that records

90. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a); 12 C.F.R. § 202.14(b)(1).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b).
92. Id. § 1691e(c).
93. Id. § 1691e(d).
94. 12 C.F.R. § 202.14(a).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g).
96. Id. § 1691e(h).
97. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810. The HMDA was amended in some respects by the
FDICIA. See infra part II.F.6; see generally Jane E. Ahrens, HMDA in the '90s: Getting the
Most from Home Mortgage Disclosures, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, January/Winter 1992, at
34; Jerome D. Groskind, What Does the HMDA Data Mean for Banks?, BANKERS MAO.,
Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 40; Thomas J. Noto, More from HMDA, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE,
January/Winter 1990, at 2; Wayne A. Schrader, The Revised HMDA Reports May Prompt
Discrimination Claims, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, July/Summer 1991, at 31; W. Kurt
Schumacher, Some Questions & Answers Concerning the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and
Regulation C, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, July/Summer 1990, at 2; Craig Ulrich, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Developments, 46 BUS. LAW. 1077 (1991).
98. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1975) [hereinafter HMDA:
Senate Hearings] (statement of Robert R. Elliott for Carla A. Hills, Secretary, HUD).
"S. 1281 is a disclosure bill that would enable the public to learn the geographical lending
patterns of most banks and savings institutions. The idea, frankly, is that many consumers
would favor institutions that kept at least some money in the community." Id. at 2 (statement
of Sen. Proxmire, Chairman of the Committee); see also H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10, 19 (1981) [hereinafter HMDA: House Report], reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2303,
2311-22.
99. HMDA? Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 5 (text of § 2(a) of S. 1281).
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about the source of deposits be maintained."°
In addition to concern about disinvestment, Congress was concerned about "redlining" at the time of the HMDA's adoption." As

adopted, the data collection requirements of the HMDA focus on this
problem rather than upon the relationship of deposits to loans. Red-

lining, of course, may be either racially or geographically motivated,
or both.
One of the primary arguments against the enactment of the
HMDA was that the regulatory burden imposed was not justified by
the value of the data collected. 0 2 The argument was made that, despite these burdens, the data collected would not be sufficient to determine whether redlining was in fact taking place.0 3
1. Applicability to Mortgage Discrimination
The HMDA, which is implemented by Reg. C,'0 4 does not prohibit mortgage discrimination of any kind. Instead, it establishes an
elaborate reporting scheme concerning home loans and home improvement loans by certain lenders. Originally, the purpose of this reporting system was to provide the public and supervisory agencies with
sufficient information to determine whether the lenders were meeting
their duty to serve the housing needs of their communities and to

enable public officials to make decisions about public sector invest-

100. Id. at 6-7 (text of § 4(a) of S. 1281).
101. Id. at I (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
102. Id. at 19-20 (statement of Frank Wille. Chairman of the FDIC).
103. Id. ("It is far from certain, however, that the requirements of this bill would provide
sufficient information to enable either citizens or public officials to adequately assess whether
depository institutions are serving the housing needs of various neighborhoods and the community."); see also Home Mortgage Disclosure Amendments of 1980: Hearings on S. 2290
and S. 2291 Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15-17 (1980) (statement of Victor Marrero, Under Secretary of HUD. concerning the
comparison of costs and benefits of HMDA data); HMDA: Senate Hearings, supra note 98,
at 20 (statement of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the FRB concerning lack of
information about mortgage rates and terms, character of property, financial, income or other
economic characteristics of the borrowers on credit demand); HMDA: House Report, supra
note 98, at 32 (minority view of the proposed statute asserting that, as revised, the disclosure
burden would be "relatively small" but that the benefits would also be "small").
104. 12 C.F.R. §§ 203.1-.6 (1992). Reg. C was amended on December 15, 1989 to
comply with the FIRREA. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,356 (1989). Those regulations were corrected on
January 8, 1990 in certain minor respects. 55 Fed. Reg. 695 (1990). For the summary of
these amendments, see HMDA Requirements Amended, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, January/Winter 1990, at 5. Reg. C was again amended on November 26, 1991 to require the use
of 1990 census tract numbers. 56 Fed. Reg. 59,853 (1991).
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ments.'t5 Its purpose has now been expanded to provide the public
and supervisory agencies with sufficient information to determine

those lenders are complying with the various fair lending
whether
06
laws.

2. Which Lenders Are Regulated?
The reporting requirements of the HMDA apply only when the
lender is either a "depository institution"' 7 which makes "federally
related mortgage loans,"10'8 or is "engaged for profit in the mortgage
lending business."' 9 For the purposes of the HMDA, a "mortgage
loan" is one secured by residential real property or a home improvement loan."0
Prior to the FIRREA, the HMDA had already been expanded
beyond its original scope to apply to mortgage banking subsidiaries of

bank and thrift holding companies and to savings and loan service
corporations. The FIRREA further expanded the HMDA to apply to
other lending institutions in the mortgage banking business."'

105. 12 U.S.C. § 2801(b); 12 C.F.R. § 203.1(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
106. 12 C.F.R. § 203.1(b)(1)(iii).
107. 12 U.S.C. § 2802(2). Depository institutions include: banks (as defined in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)), savings associations (as defined in id. § 1813(b)(1)),
and credit unions. Note that Reg. C treats a mortgage lending subsidiary of one of the
lenders as an independent entity. The result is that the subsidiary is subject to Reg. C if it
meets the "other lending institution" threshold, 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e)(2), and if it does, it
must separately comply with Reg. C. HMDA Requirements Amended, supra note 104, at 6.
108. 12 U.S.C. § 2802(2); see also 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e) (defining "financial institution").
6
109. 12 U.S.C. § 2802(4); see als 12 C.F.R. § 203.1(c) (applying Reg. C to "other
mortgage lending institutions" as defined in id. § 203.2(e)); id. § 203.2(e)(2) (defining these
institutions to mean for profit institutions other than regulated financial institutions whose
"home purchase loan originations equaled or exceeded ten percent of its loan origination
volume, measured in dollars, in the preceding calendar year").
110. 12 U.S.C. § 2802(1). A financial institution is within the scope of Reg. C only if it
"originated in the preceding calendar year a home purchase loan (other than temporary
financing such as a construction loan) secured by a first lien on a one-to-four family dwelling" which is federally regulated. 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e)(1). A for-profit mortgage lender is
within the scope of Reg. C only if its "home purchase loan" originations exceed a certain
amount. Id. § 203.2(e)(2). A "home purchase loan" refers only to a loan which is both
secured by and for the purpose of purchasing a "dwelling." Id. § 203.2(g). A "dwelling" is a
residential structure (including a condominium, a cooperative unit, a mobile home, or a
manufactured home). Id. § 203.2(d). Therefore, the applicability of Reg. C to a particular
lender depends on its activity concerning "home purchase loans," but the lender, once within
the scope of Reg. C, will also be required to report information concerning "home improvement loans." A "home improvement loan" is one that is either classified by the lender as a
home improvement loan, or one stated by the borrower at the time of the application to be
for the purpose of repairing, rehabilitating or remodeling a dwelling. Id. § 203.2(f).
111. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1211(d), 103 Stat. 183, 525 (1989); see generally Harrell,
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Even lenders which meet those standards are not automatically
responsible for compliance with the HMDA. The lender is subject to
the HMDA's reporting duties only if it has a home or branch of113
fice" 2 located within a metropolitan statistical area (an "MSA").

Also, institutions with total assets of ten million dollars or less have
been administratively
14

exempted

from

the requirements

of the

HMDA.

3.

What Activity Is Required or Prohibited?
a. Maintenance of Loan Application Register

The basic mandate of the HMDA is for the lender to maintain a
record of certain loan applications, originations, and purchases." s
That record, which Reg. C requires in an LAR format,"16 must be
maintained on a calendar year basis," 7 and must reflect all mort-

gage loans for which that lender received a completed application,"'

all mortgage loans originated by that lender," 9 and all

mortgage loans purchased by that lender. 2 This requirement of
maintaining information concerning loan applications, in addition to
information concerning loan originations and purchases, became effec-

supra note 16; infra part II.F.6. (concerning FDICIA changes).
112. For the definition of "branch office," see 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(c).
113. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1). This is determined as of December 31 of the preceding
calendar year. 12 C.F.R. § 203.3(a)(1). For the definition of MSA, see id. § 203.2(h).
114. 12 C.F.R. § 203.3(a)(2)-(3). Note that this $10 million exemption is available to
"other lending institutions" only when their assets, when combined with any parent, fall
below the threshold. Id. § 203.3(a)(3). However, a financial institution does not have to
include the assets of its holding company, if any, in applying this test. Id. § 203.3(a)(2).
Exemptions based on state law are also available under state law, in certain limited circumstances. See id. § 203.3(b).
115. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1).
116. 12 C.F.R. pt. 203 app. A (1I)(A).
117. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(d).
118. The FIRREA added this provision to the HMDA. § 1211(e), 103 Stat. at 525-26.
An "application" is any oral or written request for a home purchase loan or a home improvement loan meeting the application procedures of the institution to which it is submitted for
that type of credit. 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(b). This definition was designed by the FRB to be
consistent with the concept of an application under ECOA and Reg B. HMDA Requirements
Amended, supra note 104, at 5. In the case of an application that is denied, the reporting
takes place for the year in which the denial occurs. 12 C.F.R. pt. 203 app. A (IV)(A)(2).
119. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1). This includes refinancing. See 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a). Loans
in a fiduciary capacity, loans on unimproved land, temporary financing, the purchase of an
interest in a loan pool, and the purchase of the right to service loans need not be reported
on the LAR. Id. § 203.4(d). Loan originations are reported for the year in which the loan is
closed. Id. at pt. 203 app. A (IV)(A)(1).
120. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1).
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tive upon passage of the FIRREA for applications taken after January

1,

1990.121

The required information in the LAR must be itemized.122 In
connection with itemization, there are two separate requirements. The
first is to itemize by number and dollar amount." The second is to
itemize by additional characteristics such as the race of the applicant
or borrower. 124 The lender is not required to state its reason for denial of the loan on the LAR but may do so if it chooses. 25 This
provision permitting, but not requiring, an explanation by the lender
for the denial was added to the HMDA by the
of the reason
126
FIRREA.
The number and dollar amount itemization is intended to allow
the public and supervisory agencies to determine exactly where the
loans are (or are not) being made. Therefore, the information must be
itemized by census tract for mortgage loans secured by property in a
county with a population of more than 30,000 which is within an
MSA. 27 If that property is located in a smaller county within an
MSA, then the itemization must be made by county.128 A separate
itemization must1 29be maintained for loans secured by property not
within an MSA.
The second level of itemization requires the lender to report
30
whether the transaction involves a government backed loan,
whether the property securing the loan will be occupied by the borrower, 131 whether the loan is a home improvement loan, 32 and
certain personal characteristics of the applicant or borrower. These
personal characteristics include income level, race, and gender (the
"Personal HMDA Data").133 This requirement that the lender collect

121. See Harrell, supra note 16, at 1947.
122. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a) together with Appendix A to Reg. C specifies
the LAR. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(b) together with Appendix B to Reg. C specifies
the race, national origin, sex, and income data in the LAR.
123. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(2).
124. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a).
125. Id. § 203.4(c).
126. HMDA Requirements Amended, supra note 104, at 5.
127. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(2)(A); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 6601 (1993) (recent
regarding the definition of MSAs).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 2803(a)(2)(B).
130. Id. § 2803(b)(1).
131. Id. § 2803(b)(2).
132. Id. § 2803(b)(3).
133. Id. § 2803(b)(4). On March 12, 1992, the FRB proposed a change to
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Personal HMDA Data, in addition to the geographic information, was
added to the HMDA by the FIRREA. 3 4 The FIRREA significantly
expanded the HMDA reporting duties of the lender. Prior to the
FIRREA, the HMDA focused on geographic lending patterns rather
than upon discrimination based on the applicant's personal characteristics. The HMDA, as amended by the FIRREA, 135 is now designed
to collect more data about the applicant's personal characteristics to
enable more effective enforcement of the laws prohibiting discrimination in lending. 36 As discussed below, 3 7 however, even this expanded HMDA data has not been sufficient for that purpose.
There is a limited exemption (the "Small Lender HMDA Exemption") applicable to these LAR duties. If a lender subject to the
HMDA has assets of not more than thirty million dollars (as of its
most recent fiscal year), that lender need not collect the Personal
HMDA Data. 38 Similarly, the Personal HMDA Data need not be
collected for loans purchased.139 However, the remaining HMDA
duties continue to apply to such a lender despite the availability of
this limited exemption.
In addition to preparing this LAR, the HMDA imposes retention
requirements on the lender. Specifically, the lender must maintain the
LAR for at least five years after the close of the fiscal year covered
by each

EAR.

b.

140

Submission of LAR to Appropriate Supervisory Agency

Each lender covered by the HMDA's LAR requirements must
submit their LAR to their supervisory agency annually.' This must
be accomplished by March 1 of each calendar year following the year
for which the data is collected.' 42

tion of income for HMDA purposes. See 57 Fed. Reg. 8762 (1992). A notice of the adoption
of that change was published on September 23, 1992. See id. at 43,979.
t
134. § 1211(a), 103 Stat. at 524.
135. See Harrell, supra note 16, at 1947-48.
136. Id.
137. See infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.
138. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(); 12 C.F.R. § 203A(b)(2)(ii). The lender is not prohibited from
collecting this data if the exemption applies.
139. 12 C.F.R. § 203A(b)(2)(i). However, the lender is not prohibited from collecting this
data if the exemption applies.
140. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(c). But see 12 C.F.R. § 203.5(a) (requiring retention for two
years).
141. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(h).
142. 12 C.F.R. § 203.5(a).
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Public Availability of Disclosure Statement Based on
LAR

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (the
"FFIEC") is charged by the HMDA with the responsibility of constructing a record maintenance system to facilitate public access to the
information contained in the LARs submitted by the regulated lenders. 43 The HMDA requires that the system, as designed by the
44
FFIEC, include provisions for a central depository in each MSA.'
At each such central depository, all disclosure statements for lenders
having a home or branch office in that MSA must be available for
public inspection and copying. 4
The FRB chose to implement this requirement, after the
FJRREA, by a process which requires the lender to maintain an LAR
but not to cross tabulate data. Instead, the lender submits the data to
its supervisory agency. The FFIEC then prepares a disclosure statement for each institution and sends
it to that institution with a fac46
simile to the central depository.
In addition to public availability of information at these central
depositories, each lender must make this information (i.e., the disclosure statement prepared for that lender by the FFIEC, not the original
LAR) available for public inspection and copying t47 during the
hours that the lender is normally open for business.'4 8 This disclosure statement must first be made available within thirty calendar
days after, it is received by the lender and must be kept available for
at least five years. 49 This must be done at the lender's home office
and in at least one branch office within each MSA in which that

143. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(f).
144. Id.
145. 12 C.F.R. § 203.1(d). Under Reg. C, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (the "FFIEC") uses the data from the LARs to prepare "disclosure statements" for
each financial institution for each MSA showing patterns in lending according to location, age
of housing stock, income level, sex, and racial characteristics. Id.
146. See 55 Fed. Reg. 27,886 (1990) (samples of the disclosure statements and aggregate
MSA reports to be produced by the FFIEC from the HMDA data contained in the LARs
submitted to the various supervisory agencies).
147. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1). A reasonable charge may be imposed for photocopying. 12
C.F.R. § 203.5(c).
148. 12 C.F.R. § 203.5(c).
149. Id. § 203.5(b). As required by the Housing and Community Development Act of
1992, this information must now be made publicly available earlier. 58 Fed. Reg. 13,403

(1993).
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lender maintains a physical branch office. 50 In the case of a lender
having branch offices in more than one MSA, only the information
applicable to that MSA need be maintained at the branch office within that MSA.'-'
The HMDA does not expressly impose a notice requirement on
the lender concerning the public availability of the disclosure statement. Reg. C, however, requires a notice in the lobby of its home

office and
in the lobby of any physical branch office located in an
5 2
MSA.1

4. What Are the Remedies for Failure to Comply?
A violation of the HMDA is subject to administrative sanctions.5 3 Private remedies are not provided by the HMDA.154
D.

Community Reinvestment Act of 1977

1. Applicability to Mortgage Discrimination
The Community Reinvestment Act (the "CRA") 155 does not

150. 12 C.F.R. § 203.5(c).
151. Id.
152. Id. § 203.5(d).
153. 12 U.S.C. § 2804(c). This is implemented by 12 C.F.R. § 203.6(a). See Fed May
Consider Civil Money Penalties Against Banks that Delay on HMDA Data, 56 BNA's
BANKING REP. 732 (1991).
154. Note, however, that it appears likely that lenders with "poor HMDA showings" may
soon become defendants in class action litigation. Regulators, Experts Continue to Warn
About Dangers of Credit Discrimination, BNA BANKING DAtLY, Oct. 5, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNABD File. In other words, although the HMDA may not provide
the legal basis for the claim, it may well be a source of the evidence or provide motivation
to bring the claim.
155. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906. 12 U.S.C. § 2907 was added to the CRA by the Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring and Improvement Act of 1991. See infra
note 211 and accompanying text. Modifications to the CRA by the FDICA were enacted as
well. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text. Also, modifications to the CRA were
adopted by Congress in 1992. See infra note 275 and accompanying text. In 1977, the House
considered a version of a bill known as the Housing and Community Development Act of
1977, which did not contain a Community Reinvestment Act proposal. H.R. REP. No. 236,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884. However, the Senate held
hearings that year on a Senate bill which did contain a proposed Community Reinvestment
Act. Community Credit Needs: Hearings on S. 406 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter Community Credit
Needs]. The Senate, in 1977. eventually considered its own version of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1977, which contained a modified version of that Community Reinvestment Act proposal. S. REP. No. 175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-35 (1977). The
House Conference Report on the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 ultimately substituted that Senate version for the House version. H.R. REP. No. 634, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884, 2965, 2994-95; see generally WILLIAM R.
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specifically prohibit discrimination in mortgage lending. In fact, at the

time the CRA was enacted, one of the primary concerns of Congress
was disinvestment, 5 6 the practice of lending institutions in accepting

deposits from a specific area while declining to make an equivalent
amount of loans secured by property in that same area. The original
Senate proposal contained a definition of "primary savings service

area" as "a compact area contiguous to a deposit facility from which
such facility obtains or expects to obtain more than one-half of its

deposit customers."' 57 In connection with any application for a deposit facility, that Senate proposal would then have required the applicant to indicate the proportion of "consumer deposits" '58 from that
area which would be reinvested in that area, as well as demonstrating
the manner in which that applicant was then meeting the credit needs

HAMBLIN, CRA COMPLIANCE: A PRACTICAL PERSPECIVE (1991); Glenn Canner and Joe M.
Cleaver, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Progress Report, 66 FED. RESERVE BULL. 87
(1980); Robert P. Chamness, Is There a Need to Improve CRA Performance?, ABA BANK
COMPLIANCE, October/Autumn 1991, at 5; Warren L. Dennis, The Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977: Defining "Convenience and Needs of the Community," 95 BANKING L.J. 693
(1978); Steven J. Eisen & Keith C. Dennen, The Community Reinvestment Act: Regulators
Give It a New Emphasis, 107 BANKING LJ. 334 (1990); Allen J. Fishbein, Satisfying Your
Examiner & Satisfying Your Community Are Not Always the Same, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE,
October/Autumn 1990, at 2; Peter F. Healey, A Banker's Guide to the Community Reinvestment Act, 96 BANKING LJ. 705 (1970); Diane Knapp, The New Uniform Interagency CRA
Rating System: Summary and Checklist, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, July/Summer 1990, at 41;
Jeffrey T. Paul, Community Reinvestment Act Training, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, April/Spring
1990, at 9; James F. Pilkington, Complying With the CRA.in Rural America, ABA BANK
COMPLIANCE, October/Autumn 1991, at 31; Julia W. Seward, The "Whys" and "Hows" of
Community Outreach Programs, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, January/Winter 1991, at 26;
Patricia F. Warf, Expanding the CRA Statement-Blueprintfor Community Banks, ABA BANK
COMPLIANCE, October/Autumn 1990, at 26; Anne Marie Regan, Note, The Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: Another Attempt to Control Redlining, 28 CAT. U. L. REV. 635
(1979).
Some savings institutions, savings banks, commercial banks, and credit unions are
members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Under the FIRREA, the Finance Board
replaced the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in the supervision of Federal Home Loan
Banks. If an institution is a member of that system, additional community support requirements established by the FIRREA must be consulted. Community Support Requirements for
Members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,639 (1991).
156. See Community Credit Needs, supra note 155, at 17 (statement of Ralph Nader); S.
REP. No. 175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1977) ("While the Committee rejected the course of
setting target percentages for reinvestment, it should be self-evident that an institution exporting 99 percent of its dollars outside of the city in which it is chartered is not serving
community convenience and needs.").
157. S. 406, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(4) (1977), reprinted in Community Credit Needs,
supra note 155, at 6.
158. Id. § 3(5).
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of its existing primary service areas. 5 9 That proposal would also
have required periodic reports from financial institutions concerning
the relationship of consumer deposits to loans in primary service areas. 60 In addition to its concern with disinvestment, Congress was

also concerned with discrimination-both geographic and racial. In
facing this issue, Congress focused on the responsibilities of financial
institutions to the public which are created by the granting to that
institution of a "public charter."' 6' Therefore, the CRA, as it was
enacted, "encourages" federally regulated lenders to meet the credit
needs of their local communities. 62 The legislative history of the
CRA makes it clear that Congress did not intend to create a system
of credit allocation. 63 In direct contrast to the HMDA, however, the
CRA does impose affirmative lending obligations on the lender. Since

a lender engaging in prohibited mortgage discrimination may not be
meeting this standard, the CRA provides a potentially potent tool for
use in reversing the historical patterns of mortgage discrimination in
the United States. However, the potency of the CRA has been recognized by lenders, regulators, and community groups only in recent

years.' 6' As stated in a recent article, "[iun 1988, we said that CRA
had 'skyrocketed' in importance since 1984. If that is how CRA

changed between 1984 and 1988, then it has shot into warp drive and
surpassed the speed of light in 1990.'65

159. Id. § 4(1)(C)-(D).
160. Id. § 4(4).
161. See Community Credit Needs, supra note 155, at 9 (statement of Sen. Proxmire,
Chairman).
162. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b); see also 12 C.F.R. § 345.2 (1992). For examples of the type
of activity which the CRA has encouraged, see CRA Lending Can Bring a Profit, NAT'L
MORTGAGE NEWS, Apr. 27, 1992, at 8; Roger R. Fross et al., CRA Is No Threat to Banks
that Do Their Homework, AM. BANKER, Dec. 13, 1990, at 5; Francis X. Grady, CRA Success
Starts with a Plan, AM. BANKER, July 30, 1991. at 4; Donald Mullane, A CRA Success
Story, To Bank of America, Investing in the Community Isn't a Requirement, It's a Way of
Doing Business, MAG. OF BANK MGrr., Sept. 1991, at 37; Georgia Steele, Seafirst Doing
$I.5B CRA Program After SecPac Merger, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEws, July 20, 1992, at 10.
163. Community Credit Needs, supra note 155, at 2 (opening statement of Chairman
Proxmire). However, some legislators viewed the new law as a credit allocation approach. See
S. REP. No. 175, 95th Cong., IstSess. 82 (1977) ("'[A] rose by any other name' is still
credit allocation."').
164. Community groups, not regulators, appear to have been the primary moving force
behind enforcement of the CRA. Art, supra note 2, at 1095-101.
165. William J. Showalter and Barbara S. Pappadakes, Most Dangerous Violations: Another Update, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, January/Winter 1991, at 13, 14-15; see generally Provisions Aimed at Strengthening the Community Reinvestment Act, Hearings Before the Senate
Commission on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (con-
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2. Which Lenders Are Regulated?
' 66
The CRA applies only to "regulated financial institutions.
Since each particular category of regulated lenders is supervised by a
different "Federal financial supervisory agency,"' 67 the CRA is implemented by a series of federal regulations. In the case of national
banks, the regulations of the OCC apply. 68 Regulations of the FRB
apply to state banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System (state member banks), 69 and regulations of the FDIC apply to
those which are not (state non-member banks).'
Finally, regulations of the OTS apply to savings banks.'
In addition to these regulations issued by the individual supervi-

sory agencies, there are a number of joint regulatory policies which
must be taken into account. There is a general policy statement of the

Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies concerning the CRA. 7 2 Also, the FFIEC has issued a document in question and answer format

which addresses many of the common CRA questions,' 73 a policy

cerning the impact of CRA during its first ten years).
166. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a). The definition of "regulated financial institution" for purposes
of the CRA, incorporates the definition of "insured depository institution" from § 1813. See
id. § 2902(2). That definition includes national banks, state banks which are members of the
Federal Reserve system, state banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve system,
federal savings and loan associations and state savings and loan associations. Id. § 1813(c)(2)(5). It does not include credit unions or other mortgage lenders such as private mortgage
bankers. Id.
167. Id. § 2902(1).
168. Id. § 2902(1)(A). These regulations are located at 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.1-.8, .101 (1992).
These regulations were amended on June 12, 1991 to implement changes to the CRA made
by the FIRREA. 56 Fed. Reg. 26,899 (1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 25.5(a)(3),
(c)(3)).
169. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(1)(13). These regulations are located at 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.1-.8,
.100 (1992). These regulations were amended on June 12, 1991 to implement changes to the
CRA made by the FIRREA. 56 Fed. Reg. 26,901 (1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 228.5(a)(3), (c)(3)).
170. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(1)(C). These regulations are located at 12 C.F.R. §§ 345.1-.8,
.101-02 (1992). These regulations were amended on June 12, 1991 to implement changes to
the CRA made by the FIRREA. 56 Fed. Reg. 26,903 (1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 345.5(a)(3), (c)(3)). The FDIC has named community affairs officers to serve in the office
of Consumer Affairs in each of the eight signed offices. These officers are intended to
promote compliance with CRA and fair lending laws. 57 BNA's BANKING REP. 144 (1991).
171. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(l)(D). These regulations are located at 12 C.F.R. § 563e.l-.8
(1992).
172. Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding the Community
Reinvestment Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,742 (1989).
173. Community Reinvestment Act Interagency Questions and Answers, 57 Fed. Reg.
10,899 (1992). Question 29 of that document was amended on April 29, 1992. Id. at 18,152;
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statement on analyses of geographic distribution of lending, 74 uniform interagency guidelines for disclosure of written evaluations and
revised assessment rating system,175 and a policy aimed at consistency among the various banking agencies in CRA exams. The FFIEC
issued a press release on June 17, 1992 for the purpose of clarifying
the expectations of the various supervisory agencies concerning CRA
documentation; 76 this press release stated:
[The agencies base their evaluation of CRA performance primarily
on how well an institution helps meet the credit needs of its community or communities, not on the amount of documentation it maintains . ... [A] lack of documentation is not sufficient basis on

which to grant a poor rating if an institution's performance can
t7
otherwise be determined to be satisfactory or better.'
In making this general statement, the FFIEC also recognized that
CRA documentation would "generally be less formal and less extensive in small and rural institutions than in larger, urban institu178
tions."'
3. What Activity Is Required or Prohibited?
The CRA seeks to achieve its stated goals through a process of

see generally CRA Q&As Revised, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, June 1992, at 3 (summarizing

the revisions to question 29). These questions and answers were recently updated. 58 Fed.
Reg. 9176 (1993).
174. Comptroller of the Currency, Policy Statement on Analyses of Geographic Distribu-

tion of Lending, BANKING BULL. 92-93, February 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, OCCBJ file.
175. Uniform Interagency Community Reinvestment Act Final Guidelines for Disclosure
of Written Evaluations and Revised Assessment Rating System, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,163 (1990).
A correction to these final guidelines was issued on July 3. 1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 27,545
(1990). These guidelines were proposed in response to the requirements of the FIRREA on
December 22, 1989. 54 Fed. Reg. 52,914 (1989); see generally Interagency CRA Guidelines

Proposed. ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, Mar. 1990, at 2 (summarizing the proposed guidelines).
On March 4, 1992, the Deputy Comptroller for Compliance Management issued Revised
Uniform Interagency Examination Procedures. Comptroller of the Currency, Revised Uniform
InterAgency CRA Examination Procedures, BANKING BULL. 92-11, March 4, 1992, available

in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, OCCBJ file, *1 ("These procedures address specific assessment
factors and are grouped by the performance categories identified in the Uniform Interagency
Community Reinvestment Act Final Guidelines for Disclosure of Written Evaluations and
Revised Assessment Rating System.").
176. See Comptroller of the Currency, Community Reinvestment Act, BANKING BULL. 9243, Aug. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, OCCBJ file (rescinding BANKING
BULL. 92-11, Mar. 4, 1992).
177. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at *7.
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evaluation'79 and public disclosure. t 0 However, the goals of the
CRA and the standards for evaluation were stated by Congress in

imprecise terms.'

Congress deliberately granted broad discretion to

the supervisory agencies to implement these broad goals through the

regulatory process."' At the heart of the CRA is its subjectivity. As
stated in an article reviewing CRA in the first ten years: "In an age
in which government regulation commonly took the form of detailed

requirements, quotas, and timetables, C.R.A. followed a very different
model. It established a direction and goal, and then allowed private

industry3 latitude and discretion in choosing methods to attain the
18
goal.'
For example, some of the key operative terms in the CRA, such

as "community" and "credit," are left without definition. Despite this
subjectivity, some lenders have come to see CRA compliance as a

profit opportunity rather than as a purely regulatory burden." 4 Per179. Each supervisory agency is required to assess each financial institution's "record of
meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institution." 12 U.S.C.
§ 2903(1). This must be accomplished through written evaluations made at the conclusion of
each examination of an insured depository institution by its supervisory agency. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2906(a)(1).
180. Each written evaluation of an insured depository institution contains a public section,
which includes the rating assigned by the financial supervisory agency. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 2906(b)(1)(C).
181. E.g., Ellen Braitman, 'Nonprescriptive' CRA Regulations Defended, AM. BANKER,
May 14, 1992, at 5, 5 (in which a governor of the Board of Governors of the FRB described the CRA rules as "deliberately nonprescriptive" and said that "creativity is essential"
to compliance).
182. 12 U.S.C. § 2905.
183. Art, supra note 2, at 1073.
184. See generally Bankers Should View Community Lending as a Profitable Business,
Lenders Say, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BNABD File (reporting upon two major lenders' claims of profitability but pointing out that
two or three periods are necessary to reach desired performance levels once a new program
is initiated); Steven Cocheo, Giving Home Loans a Second Opinion: Nine Philadelphia-area
Lenders Serve the Low/Moderate Income Market with Flexible Underwriting and Cooperative
Peer Review, ABA BANKING J., Oct. 1992, at 85 (reporting on a plan under which lenders
agree not to reject a loan until all members of the group have had the opportunity to
consider it); Erica Copulsky, Banks Teaming Up with Non-Profit Orgs to Meet Low-Income
Lending Goals, BANK LmtTER, Oct. 12, 1992, at 1, 1 ("An increasing number of lenders who
are reaching more potential borrowers but do not have the capacity to turn these applications
into mortgage approval, are teaming up with non-profit organizations, housing groups and
government entities to help them meet government mandated goals for making affordable
housing loans."); Griffith L. Garwood, CRA Regulations Gain New Respectability, BANKERS
MAG., May-June 1992, at 39, 41 ("CRA may have some frustrating aspects, but paying
attention to CRA may uncover substantial opportunities that otherwise may have been ignored."); Penny Lunt, How Seven Banks Serve Low-Income Markets, ABA BANKING J., Sept.
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haps a long-term solution to the problem of mortgage discrimination
can be advanced by the creation of lender incentives which reinforce
this attitude.
The supervisory agencies have recently exercised this discretion
to encourage the use of "geocoding" by lenders to facilitate the geo-

graphic analysis of lending patterns.' 85 This policy may be the most
far reaching aspect of the CRA to date. First, it goes even farther
than the HMDA with respect to the collection of data concerning
loans because the CRA policy relates to all loan products, 86 not a

limited category of loans as in the case of the HMDA. Second, in
contrast to the HMDA which is strictly a data collection statute, the
CRA policy requires the lender to affirmatively demonstrate how it is
dealing with the trends reflected by the data collected. In this respect,
lenders are currently operating in the absence of significant guid-

ance.' 87 The new policy gives significant directions concerning the
data to be collected and the manner in which that data must be pre-

sented. However, it provides almost no useful guidance about the
specific lending patterns which will be deemed acceptable or unacceptable.
a. Defining the Community To Be Served by a Particular
Regulated Lender
As a first step in the CRA process, each regulated lender must

1992, at 57 (reporting on the specific plans undertaken by seven major lenders to meet CRA
responsibilities).
185. See Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Looking for Loans in All the Right Places, ABA BANKING
J., June 1992, at 42; Coping with "Geocoding," ABA BANKING J., June 1991, at 48; Exam
Council Approves Policy Statement to Help Banks Analyze Lending Under CRA, 57 BNA's
BANKING REP. 1010 (1991); Geographic Lending Pattern Analysis Required by FFIEC CRA
Policy Statement, THRIFr REGULATOR, Dec. 13, 1991, at 5; Going With GIS; Visual Analysis
of Geographic Decision-Making Information Is Available on PCs. MAG. OF BANK MGMT.,
Dec. 1991, at 28; Jeanne lida, Banks Pushed to Track Lending: Software to Map Credit Is
Backed by Federal Council, Am.BANKER, Dec. 23, 1991, at 3; Regulators Say Credit Distribution Analysis Is Critical to Proper CRA Management, FDIC WATCH, Dec. 13, 1991, at 5;
Warren IV. Traiger, Hot Tip from Regulators: Adopt a CRA Plan, AM. BANKER, Apr. 13,
1992, at 4.
186. Compare this to the small business and farm loan provisions adopted by the
FDICIA. See infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text. There is, obviously, a significant
additional reporting overlap.
187. See Barefoot, supra note 185, at 42-43 ("To my knowledge, agencies have provided
absolutely no written guidance to banks on how to answer the question of whether the
geographic patterns revealed by analysis are satisfactory or not ....
When you begin to
analyze your geographic lending patterns, you are stepping into the abyss.").
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delineate, and review at least annually, the local community or communities (the "Entire Community") which it will serve.' In making
this delineation, maps must18 be
used and low- and moderate-income
9
excluded.
be
not
must
areas
b.

Adopting the CRA Statement

It is possible that one institution will have an Entire Community
consisting of more than one local community. Each institution must
adopt a CRA statement for each particular local community.' 90 That
statement must include, at a bare minimum, the delineation of the
local community, the specific types of credit available from that institution in that local community, and a copy of the institution's CRA
notice.9 In addition to these mandatory elements of the CRA statement, each institution is "encouraged" to include a statement of how
its current CRA efforts help meet community credit needs, a periodic
report concerning its record in that regard, and a description of its
efforts to ascertain the actual needs of the local community.' 92
Board of director involvement in this CRA statement process is
mandatory. The board must review the statement at least annually, act
on any material change at its first regular meeting following any
change, and note all of these actions in the minutes of the board
meetings. 93
This CRA statement is a public document. A copy of each statement must be maintained at the home office.1 94 Also, the statement
applicable to a particular local community must be kept at each office
in that local community.' 5 If a member of the public asks for a
copy, it must be provided.'9 6

188. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 345.3(a).
189. See id.; see also id. § 345.3(b) (for permissible means of delineating the entire
community); id. § 345.3(c) (for an exception applicable to institutions predominantly serving
military personnel).

190. See id. § 345.4(a).
191. See id. § 345A(b). The specific types of credit in the statement must be broken
down into categories such as "residential loans" for one to four family dwellings. Id.
192. See id. § 345A(c).

193.
194.
195.
196.
mailing

See
See
See
See
may

id. § 345.4(d).
id. § 345A(e)(1).
1d. § 345A(e)(2).
id. § 345A(f). A reasonable amount not exceeding the cost of reproduction and
be charged. Id.
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c.

The Public Comment File

In addition to the CRA statement, the institution must maintain a
public comment file. Those must be "readily available for public
inspection," and must contain: (1) any signed written comments received from the public during the last two years; (2) a copy of the
public section of the institution's last CRA performance evaluation
(within 30 business days of receipt); (3) any responses to public
comments or the performance evaluation which the institution wishes
to make; and (4) any CRA statements in effect during the past two
years.' 97 A complete copy of this CRA public comment file, including the most recent CRA performance evaluation, must be maintained
at the home office.198 All materials relating to a particular local
community, as well as the most recent CRA performance evaluation,
must be available in at least one designated office in that community.'9 9 The institution must, upon request, provide any member of
the public with a copy of the public section of its most recent CRA
performance evaluation. 2°
d. The CRA Rating System
The CRA rating system was substantially modified by the
FIRREA.2 ° ' Specifically, a four-tier rating system was introduced to
replace the five-tier system in place prior to the FIRREA.20 2 Each
institution now receives a rating of outstanding, 0 3 satisfactory,
needs to improve, or substantial noncompliance.2
The public disclosure provisions of the CRA were substantially
modified by the FIRREA.0 5 Specifically, section 807 of the
FIRREA2° requires each supervisory agency to prepare a written
197. See id. § 345.5(a).
198. See id. § 345.5(c)(1), (c)(3).
199. See id. § 345.5(c)(2), (c)(3).
200. See id. § 345.5(d). A reasonable fee not to exceed the cost of reproduction and
mailing may be imposed. Id. Note that the institution must meet the public notice requirements of the regulations in order to inform the public about these rights. Id. § 345.6.
201. See generally Harrell, supra note 16; see also infra text accompanying note 271
(concerning the modifications adopted by Congress in 1992).
202. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2); see also Interagency CRA Guidelines Proposed, A.B.A.
BANK COMPLIANCE, Mar. 1990, at 2 (summarizing these changes to the rating system).
203. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2)(A); see also Elements of "Outstanding," ABA BANKING J.,
Aug. 1992, at 22 (offering an example of a type of performance receiving this rating).
204. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2)(B)-(C).
205. See generally Harrell, supra note 16.
206. See generally Interagency CRA Guidelines Proposed, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, Mar.
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evaluation of the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its
entire community (including low and moderate income neighbor-

hoods).

7

That evaluation must have a public section and a confi-

dential section." 8 The statute contemplates that the supervisory
agencies will adopt assessment factors. 209 The public section of the

report must state the agency's conclusion concerning each of those
assessment factors, the facts supporting those conclusions, and the
rating (including the basis for the rating).2 ' 0 The Resolution Trust
Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement Act of 1991

added a new section to the CRA.

n

Specifically, the CRA as

amended now requires the various supervisory agencies to give posi-

tive consideration in CRA evaluations to lenders that have sold on
favorable terms, made available on a rent-free basis, or donated a

branch in a predominantly minority neighborhood to any minority or
women's depository institution.
This rating system has been widely criticized since its enactment.

A major criticism has been that the regulators have stressed documentation of an institution's CRA efforts over actual CRA performance in
sae in a
the rating process. 213 As stated
summary of a recent survey of

1990, at 2 (summarizing § 807 of the FIRREA).
207. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a)(1).
208. Id. § 2906(a)(2); see also id. § 2906(c) (concerning the confidential section of the
evaluation).
209. Id. § 2906(b)(1)(A); see also, e.g., 12" C.F.R. § 345.7 (describing the twelve assessment factors).
210. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(1)(A)-(C).
211. Pub. L. No. 102-233, § 402(b), 105 Stat. 1761, 1775 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 2907 (Supp. IV 1992)).
212. See id.; see also Comptroller of the Currency, Community Reinvestment Act, BANKING BULL. 92-43, Aug. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, OCCBJ File
(containing guidance concerning the manner in which this new provision will be administered
by the supervisory agencies).
213. See J. Tol Broome, Jr., Being Systematic About CRA Can Boost Examiner Ratings:
A Well-Conceived Filing System for Documents Relating to Community Reinvestment Act
Compliance-While Not Guaranteeing a Favorable CRA Rating-Can Pay Big Dividends
When Examiners Come Calling, MAG. OF BANK MGMT., Aug. 1992, at 42; Correct Paperwork Is Key to Getting a Good CRA Rating; No Specific Guidelines, REG. COMPLIANCE
WATCH, Oct. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REGWTC File (citing a 1991
study by a private research group known as the Community Reinvestment Institute, claiming
that documentation is the largest factor in setting a CRA rating and that larger bankers
receive disproportionately higher ratings than smaller banks because of the resources available
to devote to documentation); Documentation Not to Be Sole Focus of CRA Exam, Federal
Regulators Say, 58 BNA's BANKING REP. 1124 (1992); Guidance: Documentation Not to Be
Sole Focus of CRA Exam, Federal Regulators Say, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 23, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNABD File; Latest OCC CRA Ratings Indicate Institu-
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financial institutions in one region of the country:
Rather than working to foster a new round of self-examination
...

. the new CRA rules seem to have prompted a defensive pos-

ture among bankers. Fully 75% of the respondents indicated that the
increased attention on CRA compliance has led them to focus on
documentation via market research projects and geo-demographic
analyses of loan portfolio data bases.214
Another related criticism has been that the CRA ratings issued by the
supervisory agencies have been inflated.1 5 Although the CRA has
created many administrative nightmares and is often subject to charges of grade inflation, it has brought about significant improvements in

tions Need to Do a Better Job at Compliance, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Mar. 23, 1992, at
2 (suggesting that some institutions performing well under the CRA may receive low ratings
merely because of poor record keeping); Barry J. Zadworny, Documentation Can Mean CRA
Success, AM. BANKER, Mar. 4, 1992, at 4, 4 ("Usually, the key to a quality CRA rating
boils down to: documentation."). Note, however, that the FFIEC has adopted a new policy
intended to make CRA exams focus more on performance than documentation. See supra
notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
214. John C. Foreman & J. McDuffie Brunson, CRA: Bankers on the Defensive: Bankers
Focus on Documentation of Community Lending Efforts in Response to New CRA Rules,
MAG. OF BANK MGMr., Jan. 1991, at 34, 34 (reporting on a study by Deloite & Touche of
financial institutions in the Mid-Atlantic region to determine the reactions to the FIRREA
strengthening of CRA); see also Linda Corman, Community Relations Study Finds Documentation Biggest Factor in CRA Rating, AM. BANKER, June 3, 1991, at 7, 7 ("A study for a
nonprofit research group has concluded that documentation is more important than home loan
commitments in determining banks' ratings under the Community Reinvestment Act.").
215. E.g., Teresa Carson, Only 10 of 2,000 Institutions Got the Lowest CRA Rating, AM.
BANKER, May 31, 1991, at 2 (reporting on a study by a Miami based consulting firm that
only 10 oui of 2,000 institutions studied had received the loosest CRA rating). In FDIC
Willing to Evaluate CRA Rating System, Taylor Pledges, 58 BNA's BANKING REP. 765
(1992), a study of the National Community Reinvestment Network (the "NCRN") titled Inflated Grades and Dubious Performances was reported. Rev. Charles Smith, the national president of the NCRN, stated that "'Growing disparities between "outstanding" CRA ratings and
inadequate bank performances could soon undermine the credibility and effectiveness of bank
regulatory bodies."' Id. at 766. Another commentator has stated:
With nearly 4,400 banks and thrifts-or almost one out of three-having
been evaluated, only 49-or just over 1%--have received the lowest rating, "substantial noncompliance."
At this rate, about 150 banks and thrifts in the country are likely to receive
this grade, These institutions, as well as the other 99%, may ask: How subjective
are the ratings?
Kenneth H. Thomas, Rising Above CRA Noncompliance, AM. BANKER, Nov. 6, 1991, at 4, 4.
But see Regulators Find CRA Performance Lacking for One Out of 10 Institutions Examined,
BNA BANKING DAILY, July 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNABD File
(reporting that approximately one out of every ten banking institutions examined for CRA
compliance since July 1, 1990 has received a "needs to improve" rating).
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lending practices. 1 6

4. What Are the Remedies for Failure to Comply?
Private remedies for CRA violations are not expressly provided.2 7 However, the teeth given to the CRA by Congress are found
in the ability of supervisory agencies to take an institution's record
for meeting the credit needs of its entire community into account in

connection with any application for a deposit facility.

In an arti-

cle reviewing the impact of the CRA ten years following its enact-

ment, one author described the number of denials of deposit facility
applications on CRA grounds as "minuscule and, for at least one of
the supervisory agencies, zero., 2 9 However, this tool is now being
used frequently by the regulators.2 20

216. E.g., Art, supra note 2, at 1072. Art states:
Modifying the behavior, attitudes, and norms of the banking industry and of banking regulatory agencies, in relation to issues of social responsibility, is an accomplishment of major proportions. The Federal Community Reinvestment Act, enacted
in 1977 with that ambitious goal, has succeeded to a significant extent, and is
likely to become increasingly important in coming years.
Id.; see Robert B. Cox, Community Relations: With Big Push, Harris Wins Satisfactory
Rating, AM. BANKER. Oct. 20, 1992, at 14 (citing the actions taken to improve CRA performance by a large financial institution after receiving a "needs to improve rating" which
caused it to shelve plans to buy another institution); Joseph M. Neal, CRA Plays Las Vegas,
NAT'L MORTGAGE NEws, Sept. 28, 1992, at 4 (claiming that the CRA has played a "pivotal
role" in transforming lending practices).
217. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, courts have generally
denied any claim to an implied private right of action under CRA. Hicks v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 970 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1992) (dicta); Coming Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd., 571 F. Supp. 396, (E.D. Ark. 1983), affd 736 F.2d 479 (8th Cir.
1984) (dicta); Harambee Uhuru School v. Kemp, No. C2-90-949, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15125, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30. 1992) ("[The Court agrees with the dicta in Hicks v.
Resolution Trust Corp., supra, to the effect that no private right of action exists under the
Community Reinvestment Act.").
218. 12 U.S.C. § 2903. The term "application for a deposit facility" is broadly defined to
include branch applications and merger applications. Id. § 2902(3); see also 12 C.F.R.
§ 345.8.
219. Art, supra note 2, at 1101; see also Regulators Have Been Lax on Enforcing CRA:
Cranston, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 21, 1992, at 12 (only eight of forty thousand bank
applications to expand were denied based on CRA performance from 1977 to 1988). Contrast

this with the following characterization of the CRA in a 1991 article: "Once a sleepy little
statute without much bite, the political convulsions of the 1980s transformed the CRA into a
formidable force for social change." Nancy R. Wilsker, The Community Reinvestment Act of
1977: The Saga Continues . . . , 46 Bus. LAW. 1083, 1083 (1991).
220. See Kenneth Cline, Paying Up for CRA, AM. BANKER, Sept. 16. 1992, at 2 (A
holding company for an Atlanta, Georgia based savings and loan association, Decatur Federal
Savings and Loan, recently agreed to settle (without any admission of wrongdoing) with the
U.S. Justice Department in a case alleging discriminatory lending by the thrift. This was
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E. Title III of Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the
"ADA"),"1 which is implemented by a regulation of the United

States Department of Justice,222 is largely "uncharted territory."
However, it is likely
years in the area of
worded prohibition
Specifically, Title III

3

to be a major source of litigation in upcoming
mortgage discrimination because of its broadly
against discrimination based on disability.'
of the ADA provides that, "No individual shall

be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and

apparently the first payment of a fine by a financial institution for a CRA violation.); Fed
Cites CRA Grade in Blocking a Merger, AM. BANKER, Aug. 14, 1992, at 14 (CRA a key
factor in applications other than expansion, merger or acquisition applications, such as an
application to convert from a savings and loan association to a national bank); see also
Compliance with the CRA Is a Critical Factor in OCC's Consideration of Bank Application,
REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Sept. 28, 1992, at 2; CRA Is Now a Key Factor in Feds Scrutiny
of Mergers: Time Consuming Process, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Aug. 17, 1992, at 1
(senior officers of large financial institution claim that CRA compliance was the most time
consuming part of a recent merger application); Statistics Show CRA Tops Regulatory Burdens
While Politics Interfere with Compliance, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Aug. 24, 1992, at 4
(bankers complain that even the highest CRA rating is not insulation from a CRA challenge
to a merger or acquisition application).
221. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 353 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Supp.
Im 1992)); see generally ADA Compliance Is Uncharted Territory, ABA BANKING I., Jan.
1992, at 20; Brian Irion, Facilities Compliance Under the ADA (Batteries Not IncludedSome
Assembly Required), ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, JaniWinter 1992, at 2; Anne Wallace, Making
Bank Services Accessible: The Challenge of Complying with Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, OctJAutumn 1991, at 39.
222. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36).
223. ADA Compliance Is Uncharted Territory, supra note 221.
224. Wallace, supra note 221, at 42.
Congress did not amend ECOA when it enacted the ADA; the ECOA is
not even mentioned in the legislative history. However, for all practical purposes,
Title Il must be regarded as a de facto amendment to the ECOA's prohibition of
discrimination in any aspect of a credit transaction.
Three of Title III's requirements . . . have a direct bearing on a bank's
credit services: the general prohibition against discrimination in § 36.201(a); Section
36.301(a), which prohibits the use of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out individuals with disability from fully and equally enjoying a service;
and Section 36.302(a), which requires reasonable modification in policies, practices
or procedures.
A loan is clearly a service of a place of public accommodation; therefore, a
bank may not deny an individual access to a loan on the basis of a disability. A
bank will have to consider whether its 'eligibility criteria,' in other words, its
credit policies, screen out persons with disabilities, or whether other bank policies
or practices unreasonably impede access to credit.
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equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,

or accommodation of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public

accommodation. ' 2z A financial institution is clearly a "public accommodation" as that term is used in Title I of the ADA.,

Fur-

thermore, Title Imof the ADA provides specific descriptions of activities which will be considered to be prohibited discrimination. The
specifically prohibited activities include:
[Imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or
tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of
individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any
goods, services .... privileges, advantages ... unless such criteria
can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods,...
services

...

privileges, advantages ...

being offered.m

F. Federal Deposit Insurance CorporationImprovement Act of 1991
1. Overview
-The FDICIA228 does not contain many of the sweeping banking
reforms, such as the removal of barriers to interstate branching, which
were originally proposed by the United States Department of the

Treasury.

9

However, it contains a number of provisions which will

have a significant impact upon the above-discussed laws regulating

mortgage discrimination. Those provisions are analyzed in this section
of the Article.

2. Section 122: Small Business Loan Reporting
The small business and farm loan reporting provision of the

225. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
226. Id. § 12181(7)(F) (specifically including any "other service establishment").
227. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
228. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991). The Senate version of this legislation
was S. 543, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also S. REP. No. 167, 102d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1991); H.R. REP. No. 330, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1901; H.R. REP. No. 293, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (report on H.R. 2094, 102d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1991), which served as the basis for Title I of H.R. 3768, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991)). After conference, the Senate bill was passed in lieu of the House bill upon amending its language to contain much of the text of the House bill. H.R. REP. No. 407, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1964; see also 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1966 (President Bush's statement upon signing the legislation).
229. See generally Muckenfuss et al., supra note 17, at 37. Compare the broad scope of
S. 543 as reflected in the October 1, 1991 Senate Report with the legislation as enacted. S.
REP. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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FDICIA

°

is nothing short of remarkable when its relative brevity

and lack of specificity are compared to its potential impact upon
financial institutions."' Section 122 requires the appropriate federal
banking agencies, within 180 days following the enactment of the
FDICIA, to "prescribe regulations requiring insured depository institutions to annually submit information on small businesses and small

farm lending in their reports of condition." 2
Very little guidance is given to the banking agencies by this

legislation about the specific lending activities to which it will apply,
or about the type of information that is to be contained in the required reports. However, section 122 does specify the type of infor-

mation needed "to assess the availability of credit to small businesses
and small farms."

3

Additionally, section 122 provides that it is

permissible (not mandatory) to require information about: the total
number and aggregate dollar amount of commercial loans and commercial mortgage loans to small businesses; the charge-offs, interest,

230. § 122, 105 Stat. at 2251; see generally Lauryn Franzoni, Small-Business Lenders
Brace for Law's Tough Reporting Rules, AM. BANKER, Jan. 8, 1992, at 1; Small Business
Loan Portfolios of Banks Subject to Increased Regulatory Scrutiny, REG. COMPLIANCE
WATCH, Mar. 16, 1992, at 3.
231. Note the potential conflict between this provision and the ECOA.
The ABA questioned the FDICIA requirement that banks begin to report, as a part
of their call reports, as yet unspecified information on small business and small
farm loans, including minority ownership information data. "Since it is illegal for
banks to collect such minority ownership information because to do so might indicate a pattern of discrimination, banks have no idea how they will comply,"
McLaughlin explained.
ABA Urges Regulators to Ease Burden on Smaller Community Banks, 58 BNA'S BANKING
REP. 497, 499 (1992).
232. § 122(a), 105 Stat. at 2251. The operative terms in this legislative mandate, "small
business" and "small farm," are not defined. On November 17, 1992, the FFIEC adopted
annual reporting requirements to go into effect June 30, 1993 under sections 122 and 477 of
the FDICIA. 57 Fed. Reg. 54,235 (1992).
In general, these institutions would be required to report information once each
year as of June 30 on the number and amount currently outstanding of (a)
nonfarm nonresidential real estate loans and commercial loans with original
amounts of $100,000 or less, more than $100,000 through $250,000, and more than
$250,000 through $1,000,000 and (b) agricultural real estate and agricultural loans
with original amounts of $100,000 or less, more than $100,000 through $250,000,
and more than $250,000 through $500,000. Thus, business loans with 'original
amounts' of $1 million or less and farm loans with 'original amounts' of $500,000
or less would serve as proxies for loans to small businesses and small farms.
Id. at 54,235-36; see also FFIEC Adopts New Reporting Requirements for Small Business and
Small Farm Loans, BNA BANKING DAILY, Nov. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNABD File.
233. § 122(b), 105 Stat. at 2251.
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and interest fee income on commercial loans and commercial mortgage loans to small business; and agricultural loans to small
farms. 4
3. Section 223: The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Section 223"~ is another element of the FDICIA which, although innocuous at first glance, presents significant compliance issues for financial institutions. First, section 223 amends the ECOA to
require supervisory agencies to refer information to the United States
Attorney General whenever the agency has "reason to believe that 1
or more creditors has engaged in a pattern or practice of discouraging
or denying applications ...

in violation of' the ECOA. 36 Second,

it amends the ECOA to authorize the Attorney General to obtain
actual and punitive damages in pattern and practice cases. 2 7 Third,
in cases in which a referral by an agency of a potential violation is
not made to the Attorney General, the supervisory agency must refer
the matter to HUD (and notify the applicant) when the agency has
reason to believe that the ECOA or the FHA has been violated.238
Fourth, a provision has been added to the ECOA requiring the creditor to provide the loan applicant with a copy of the appraisal of the
collateral in certain situations.239
This appraisal delivery requirement is troublesome both in its
lack of specificity and in the potential liability exposure of the lender
to third parties which it creates. 240 The basic mandate of this provision is that the lender "promptly" furnish a copy of the appraisal to
an applicant who makes a written request "within a reasonable period
of time of the application." 241 The statute specifies that the creditor
is allowed to require reimbursement for the cost of the appraisal.
However, it leaves a number of important questions unanswered. Must
notice of this new right be given to the applicant in advance? What

234. § 122(d), 105 Stat. at 2252. It appears that this section may have been mislabeled
as 122(d) rather than 122(c).
235. § 223, 105 Stat. at 2306; see generally Francis X. Grady, The Risks of Disclosing
Mortgage Appraisals, AM. BANKER, June 18, 1992, at 4; § 477, 105 Stat. at 2387 (for a

related section of the FDICIA).
236. § 223(a), 105 Stat. at 2306.
237. § 223(b), 105 Stat. at 2306.
238. § 223(c), 105 Stat. at 2306.

239. § 223(d), 105 Stat. at 2306-07.
240. See Grady, supra note 235.
241. § 223(d), 105 Stat. at 2306. But see 57 Fed. Reg. 57,697 (1992) (proposed rule
resolving some, but not all, of these issues).
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is a "prompt" request for the applicant? What is a "reasonable time"
within which to deliver the appraisal copy? Perhaps most importantly,
will the lender be liable to a third party such as an investor in the
business of the applicant if that third party is damaged by reason of
reliance on the appraisal?
4. Regulatory Burden Study
As so often happens when a body, such as Congress, is faced
with a difficult issue involving many competing interests, the easy
solution is to simply decide to study the problem further. This was
the approach taken by the FDICIA to the problem of the regulatory
burden on financial institutions. Within one year following the enactment of the FDICIA, section 22 of the FDICIA provides that the
FFIEC (in consultation with industry, consumer, community and other
organizations) must accomplish two tasks. First, it must review the
regulatory burden, determine whether it is "unnecessary" in any respect, and identify any changes that may be made without negatively
effecting consumers or the safety and soundness of the banking system. Second, it must report its findings to Congress. 42
5. Section 222: The Community Reinvestment Act
Section 222243 expands the public section of the CRA evaluation of a financial institution by its supervisory agency. Currently,
that public section must contain the supervisory agency's conclusion
concerning each separate assessment factor, the facts supporting those
conclusions, and the rating given to the institution (together with the
basis for that rating). Section 222 now requires that the data supporting the supervisory agency's conclusions relating to each assessment
factor be made public as well. 2'
6. Section 224: The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
Certain non-depository lenders (mortgage lending companies) are
now subject to the reporting requirements of the HMDA.245 Section
224246 authorizes the FRB to amend Reg. C to create an exemption

242.

§ 221, 105 Stat. at 2305. On December 17, 1992, the FFIEC released this study.

FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, STUDY ON REGULATORY BURDEN

(1992).
243.
244.
245.
246.

§ 222, 105 Stat. at 2306.
§ 222(a), 105 Stat. at 2306.
12 U.S.C § 2802(2)(B).
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 224, 105 Stat. at 2236, 2307; see generally Fed Proposal
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for those lenders "that are comparable within their respective indus-

tries" to exempt depository institutions.

7

On July 29, 1992, the

FRB proposed for comment an amendment to Reg. C which would

establish an exemption based on asset size identical to the ten million
dollar exemption applicable to depository institutions. However, that
proposed regulation would, regardless of asset size, continue to cover

those mortgage lending companies if2 48they made 600 or more mortgage loans in the prior calendar year.
7.

Section 233: The Bank Enterprise Act

Potentially the most potent provision of the FDICIA applicable to
mortgage discrimination is section 233.249 However, it is only potentially potent because Congress has not yet chosen to appropriate
the funds which would bring it to life. Section 233 does not take
''

effect until "appropriations are specifically [authorized] in advance. 50

Would Set Small-Institution Disclosure Exemption Standard Under HMDA, BNA BANKING
DAILY, July 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNABD File [hereinafter Fed
Proposal]; 57 Fed. Reg. 56,963 (1992) (implementing this exemption).
247. § 224(a)(3), 105 Stat. at 2307.
248. See Fed Proposal, supra note 246.
249. §§ 231-234, 105 Stat. at 2308-17.
250. Id. § 233(0. Congress debated the funding of this Bank Enterprise Act in 1992.
Representative Thomas Ridge (R-Pa.) originally announced that he would seek $60 million in
funding for the fiscal year 1993. Financial Institutions, Rep. Ridge to Ask For $60 Million to
Fund FDICIA's Bank Enterprise Act, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTVES (BNA), July 23, 1992, at
142. However, the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives recommended
only $1 million. Claudia Cummins, $1 Million to Start 'Greenlining,' AM. BANKER, July 31,
1992, at 13; FSLIC Resolution Fund Halved, Ridge Gets $1 Million, Under Committee Bill,
59 BNA's BANKING REP. 129 (1992); see also infra note 275 (concerning the actual funding
resolution). The underlying concept of the Bank Enterprise Act, greenlining, was one theme
in last year's presidential election. Although a Republican representative pushed Congress to
fund the Bank Enterprise Act, the theme was part of the Democratic platform. See "A National Economic Strategy For America," issued by Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton, Democratic
Presidential Contender, June 21, 1992, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), June 21, 1992,
at 121 ("Create a nationwide network of community development banks to provide small
loans to low-income entrepreneurs- and homeowners in the inner cities .... Ease the credit
crunch in our inner cities by passing a more progressive Community Reinvestment Act to
prevent 'redlining' and require financial institutions to invest in their communities."); Platform: New Focus on CRA, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEwS, July 20, 1992, at 17; Michael Quint, A
Bank Shows It Can Profit and Follow a Social Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at Al.
Jesse Jackson observed that:
Both the president and [the] challenger agree that our cities and poor people need
jobs, and that jobs require investment. The president sporadically embraces 'enterprise zones' in the cities, offering tax breaks to attract private capital. Clinton
espouses community development banks, surely a good idea. But neither has offered initiatives commensurate with the size of our problems . ...
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Section 233 is, put as euphemistically as possible, not a model
of clear drafting. Accordingly, it creates the potential for significant
disputes over its meaning in numerous respects. Nonetheless, it should
be retained due to the potential for positive change which it provides.
First, section 233 establishes the Community Enterprise Assessment Credit Board"1 (the "CEACB"). It is the duty of that board to
"establish procedures for accepting and considering applications by
insured depository institutions . . . for community enterprise assessment credits and making determinations with respect to such applications. ' ' 2
Second, section 233 establishes a procedure allowing an "insured
depository institution" 253 to qualify for a "community enterprise assessment credit" (a "CEAC") for any semiannual period. 4 This
CEAC may be earned in either of the following ways: (1) an increase
(section 2A increase) in that semiannual period in "new originations
of qualified loans and other financial assistance provided for low-andmoderate income persons in distressed communities, 25 or enterprises
integrally involved with such neighborhoods" 2 6 (according to standards to be set by the CEACB); 257 or (2), an increase (section 2B
increase) in that semiannual period in "the amount of deposits accepted from persons domiciled in the distressed community, at any office
of the institution (including any branch) located in any qualified distressed community" and any increase in that semiannual period in
"new originations of loans and other [qualified] financial assistance

Jesse Jackson, We Must Stop the War on the Poor, NEWSDAY, May 12, 1992, at 84.
251. § 233(d), 105 Stat. at 2314-15.
252. § 233(e)(1), 105 Stat. at 2315.
253. § 233(a)(1), 105 Stat. at 2311. This is an institution defined as such under section
(c)(2) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2) (1988).
254. § 233(a)(2), 105 Stat. at 2311.
255. The term "qualified distressed community" is defined in § 233(b), 105 Stat. at
2312-14. First, the lender must notify the agency and the public of its intent to treat an area
as such and the agency is given a 90 day period to disapprove. Second, the area must meet
certain population requirements. Third, the area must qualify as distressed under at least two
out of three standards set by § 233 (Income (at least 70% of families and unrelated individuals in the area have incomes of less than 80% of the median income in the area); Poverty
(at least 20% of residents have incomes below poverty level); and Unemployment (rate for
the area is at least 1 1/2 times the national average)). § 233(b)(2)-(4), 105 Stat at 2313-14.
256. § 233(a)(2)(A), 105 Stat. at 2311. The factors which the Community Enterprise
Assessment Credit Board (the "CEACB") may take into account include, but are apparently
not limited to, the factors specified in § 233(a)(4), 105 Stat. at 2311-12. However, investments that are not the result of originations are not to be taken into account. § 233(a)(6),
105 Stat. at 2312.
257. § 233(a)(4), 105 Stat. at 2311-12.
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made within that community." 8
Third, the amount of the credit under section 233 depends upon
whether the lender is qualified as a "community development organization '
(a "CDO"). The amount of the credit is five percent if
the lender does not meet the CDO standards, and fifteen percent if it
does meet the CDO standards. 261 This percentage is applied against
the section 2A increases plus the amount of section 2B increases.2 6'
262

8. Section 304: Uniform Real Estate Lending Standards
Within nine months following the enactment of the FDICIA, all
federal banking agencies are required to adopt certain "uniform regulations" for real estate lending to become effective within fifteen
months following the enactment of the FDICIA.263 These standards
are to apply to loans secured by liens on real estate or made for the
purpose of financing the construction of a building or improvements
to real estate.26
These new standards are not expressly required by section 304 to
take mortgage discrimination into account. However, they are required
to take into account "risk posed to the deposit insurance funds," "safe
and sound operation" of the institution, and "availability of credit. '265 Variations in these standards are permitted for requirements
of federal statutes. 26 Therefore, the adoption of these standards
should require regulators to address some of the tensions in the law
relating to mortgage discrimination among these various factors.267

258.

§ 233(a)(2)(B), 105 Stat. at 2311. Section 233(a)(2)(B) provides that the amount of

any credit for increased deposits at any institution or branch may not be greater than the
credit for increased loans and other financial assistance by the bank or branch in the distressed community.
259. § 233(a)(3), 105 Stat. at 2311. Although § 233(a)(3) refers to a "community development organization" under § 235, this cross reference appears to be a drafting error since

the provisions for those organizations are found in § 234.
260. Id. The CEACB is given authority to adjust these percentages within a stated range.

Specifically, the rate for institutions meeting the community development organization standards must at all times be at least three times that of the rate for all others. § 233(a)(5),
105 Stat. at 2312. Furthermore, a cap on the credit is set by § 233. It may not exceed 20%
in the case of a lender not meeting the community development organization standards, or
50% in case of a lender meeting those standards. § 233(c), 105 Stat. at 2314.

261.
262.
263.
264.

§ 233(a)(3).
§ 304, 105 Stat. at 2354.
Id.
Id.

265. Id.
266. Id.
267. E.g., Paul S. Nadler, You Can't Have It Both Ways, Folks, AM. BANKER, July 22,
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G.

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992

A number of proposals for legislation having an impact on mortgage discrimination were brought before Congress in 1992. Only one
was enacted. The mortgage discrimination aspects of the new law, as
summarized below, do not provide anything approaching a comprehensive solution.
As the 102d Congress was about to adjourn, banking discrimination legislation applicable to the issue of mortgage was finally enacted.26 That legislation was signed by President Bush on October 28,
1992,269 and is titled the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1992270. The Senate in 1992 originally considered government
sponsored enterprises ("GSE") legislation, which also contained a
number of banking provisions.27 On the other side, the House in
1992 originally considered a straight GSE bill.272
As a compromise between the Senate and House GSE proposals,
the language of another Senate housing bill273 was inserted in lieu
of the text of the House proposal. That compromise was ultimately

1991, at 4 (discussing the potential for tensions between demands upon financial institutions
to return to profitability made in conjunction with demands to meet the credit needs of the
community); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 62,890 (1992).
268. H.R. CoNw. REP. No. 1017, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The text of the conference report together with the legislation is printed at 138 CONG. REc. H1i1,942-12,056 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 1992). See also Senate Passes Banking Measures on GSEs, Regulatory Relief, and
Money Laundering, 59 BNA's BANKING REP. 556 (1992) (discussing the legislative process
leading to the passage of the conference report).
269. Bush Signs Housing Bill with Sections on Relief GSE's and Money Laundering, 59
BNA's BANKING REP. 619 (1992).
270. Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672.
271. S. 2733, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). This bill was introduced on May 19, 1992
by Senator Donald W. Riegle (D-Mich.). See also S. REP. No. 282, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992). The bill was titled the Federal Housing Enterprises Regulatory Reform Act of 1992.
This Senate Report chronicled the "continued ill of racial discrimination in mortgage lending
throughout the country." Id. at 42. Section 514 of the proposal made by that Senate Report
would have required HUD to promulgate regulations prohibiting government sponsored
enterprises ("GSEs") from discriminating in mortgage purchases on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, family status, age, or national origin, and would have required that
each GSE's underwriting and appraisal standards prohibit that same type of discrimination by
lenders. Also, GSE underwriting and appraisal standards would have been required to prohibit
lenders from considering age and location of property in a way that would have had a
discriminatory effect. Id. at 68-69.
272. Senate Passes Banking Measures on GSEs, Regulatory Relief and Money Laundering, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNABD File.
273. S. 3031, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see also S. REP. No. 332, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1992).
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enacted as the HCDA.
The HCDA contains a number of provisions relevant to the issue
of mortgage discrimination:
1. Provisions easing the regulatory burden:274 None of these
regulatory burden provisions relate directly to the issue of discrimination in mortgage lending. Conspicuously absent are any provisions
dealing with the administrative burdens of the CRA and HMDA.

2. Community Reinvestment Act modifications (factors to be
considered by regulators in evaluating performance): In evaluating the

record of a financial institution for CRA purposes, the HCDA adds a
factor which the supervising agency is entitled to take into account.

Specifically, "capital investment, loan participation, and other ventures
undertaken by the institution in cooperation with minority- and wom-

en-owned financial institutions and low-income credit unions" may be
considered when the record of a non minority-owned and non women-owned financial institution is being evaluated. s
3. Bank Enterprise Act: Technical amendments were made to
section 233 of the FDICIA, part of the Bank Enterprise Act.27 6 In

addition to these technical amendments by the HCDA, a separate
created a minimal level of funding for the Bank Enterprise
provision
77
2

Act.

4. Fair Housing Initiatives Program: Section 905 of HCDA was

274. §§ 951-957, 106 Stat. at 3892-97. These provisions amend the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2604 (1988) (settlement cost estimates); the Competitive
Equality Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3806 (1988) (adjustable rate mortgage caps); the Home
Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988) (capitalization rules for savings association
subsidiaries not engaged in activities which are impermissible for national banks); the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3341 (1988) (real estate
appraisals); the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 375 (1988) (insider lending); the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1831 (1988) (compensation standards for directors,
officers and employees); and the Truth-In-Savings Act. 12 U.S.C. § 4302 (1988); see generally Robert M. Garsson, Bankers Seeking Regulatory Relief Count on Bush to Sign Housing
Bill, AM. BANKER, Oct. 13, 1992, at 1; House Passes Housing Bill With Burden Relief, GSE
Provisions: Senate on Hold, 59 BNA's BANKING RP. 521 (1992) (summarizing all regulatory
relief provisions); Last Hours of Congress Lift Load of Regulation, REG. COMPLIANCE
WATCH, Oct. 12, 1992, at 1.
275. § 909, 106 Stat. at 3874.
276. § 1604(b)(2)-(3), 106 Stat. at 4083.
277. Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571, 1614 (1992). This provision allocated
$1,000,000 to meet the "necessary expenses of issuing minimum requirements and guidelines
under sections 232(a) and 233(a) of the Bank Enterprise Act of 1991, except for 233(a)(I)(B)
(12 U.S.C. 1834(a) and 1834a(a)), and in estimating the cost of allowing reduced assessment
rates and assessment credits." Id. Funds were not appropriated to actually implement the
assessment needs or reduced assessments. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss3/2

40

Boehmer: Mortgage Discrimination: Paperwork and Prohibitions Prove Insuffi
19931

MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION

enacted in response to a congressional finding of "pervasive discrimination in the nation's mortgage lending markets. 278 These changes
included a directive to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to use funds to "conduct, through contracts with private nonprofit fair housing enforcement organizations, investigations of violations under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and such
enforcement activities as appropriate to remedy such violations. 279
The investigation and enforcement activities within the scope of this
section expressly include discrimination in housing loans. 8 0
5. Report on community development lending: The FRB is required by the HCDA to submit a report on community development
lending to Congress within one year.2 8' That report is to be prepared by the FRB in consultation with the OCC, FDIC, OTS, and
NCUA.282 The report must compare "residential, small business and
commercial lending by insured depository institutions in low-income,
minority, and distressed neighborhoods to such lending in other neighborhoods.,283 The comparison must specifically address the following factors: (a) risks and returns on lending, (b) reasons for differences in risks and returns, and (c) ways of mitigating any identified risks
of lending in low-income, minority, and distressed neighborhoods. 284
H. 1992 Legislative Proposals: A Glimpse into the Future
There is likely to be a major push for legislation concerning
mortgage discrimination and community reinvestment in the next
session of Congress. 285 The number of proposals (summarized below) introduced in 1992 suggests this outcome.
Some of the 1992 proposals were specifically aimed at the CRA.
For example, Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.) introduced a proposal in April 1992 which would have exempted certain institutions
from the CRA.286 In order to be exempt from the CRA, a financial

278. § 905(a)(5), 106 Stat. at 3869.
279. § 905(b)(2), 106 Stat. at 3869 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 3616 note (1988)).
280. Id.

281. § 910, 106 Stat. at 3874-75.
282. Id.
283. § 910(a), 106 Stat. at 3874.
284. § 910(b), 106 Stat. at 3874-75.
285. Reg Reduction Bill Won't Pass, but Gives Signal to Ease Burden: FDICIA Blow
Softened?, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, July 13, 1992, at 1.
286. S. 2511, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see also Kassebaum Would Exempt Small
Country Banks from CRA Exams, BANK LEtTER, Apr. 13, 1992, at 5.
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institution would have been required to meet the following three
requirements: Community Size-main office (and all branches) located
in a community of 15,000 or less which is not part of a metropolitan
statistical area;287 Asset Size-assets (when combined with any parent) of seventy-five million dollars or less in the aggregate; 288 and
Loan/Deposit Ratio-loans made (secured and unsecured) are at least
fifty percent of deposits.289
In introducing this proposal, Senator Kassebaum claimed that
CRA emphasis should be placed on "inner-city redlining."29 However, the underlying premise of the CRA is the responsibility of all
291
institutions to their communities based on the grant of a charter.
That responsibility exists regardless of an institution's size. Therefore,
it would be preferable to adopt a functional approach rather than an
arbitrary size based approach-the compliance burden for small institutions should ordinarily be far less than for larger institutions, but
the duty should nonetheless exist.
Representative Bill McCollum (R-Fla.) introduced a proposal in
the House in June 1992 aimed directly at the CRA called the Community Reinvestment Improvement Act of 1992.292 In introducing
that bill, Representative McCollum stated that "even a reduction in
regulatory compliance costs of 25 percent last year could have resulted in an increase of $25 billion in bank loans. 29
That bill would have reduced the CRA's regulatory burden 294
through adoption of the following measures: First, certain financial
institutions would have been exempted from the CRA. The exempted
institutions would have been those with assets of less than 100 million dollars (adjusted annually) located in communities of 25,000 or
less. 295 Second, certain financial institutions would have been entitled to the benefit of a simplified CRA evaluation process. This
would have been a self-certification process for banks with less than
500 million dollars in assets (adjusted annually), at least a "satisfacto-

287. S.2511 § 1.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. 138 CONG. REc. S4655 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1992).
291. See supra note 161-62 and accompanying text.
292. H.R. 5497, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
293. 138 CONG. REc. E1993 (daily ed. June 26, 1992).
294. See McCollum Adds to Number of Regulatory Burden Reduction Bills, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNABD File.
295. H.R. 5497 § 3 (proposing the addition of § 810, amending the Community Rein-

vestment Act of 1977).
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ry" CRA rating, and no recent ECOA violations.296 Finally, financial institutions with a good CRA record would have been placed in
a safe-harbor. In other words, a financial institution with a recent
"satisfactory" or "outstanding" rating would have been immune from
a CRA challenge to an application for a deposit facility.297
Representative McCollum's approach is not advisable for several
reasons. In addition to the inherent limitations of a size-based exemption, the self certification process takes a hands-off approach to enforcement of a statute which regulators for too many years addressed
in a hands-off fashion. Also, the approach creates incentives for favorable ratings without creating comparable disincentives for poor
ratings.
Representative Frank Annunzio (D-Ill.) introduced another CRA
proposal in August 1992 known as the Community Reinvestment Act
Amendments of 1992.298 The purpose of this proposal, far more
limited in scope than the proposals of Senator Kassebaum and
Representative McCollum, was to bring domestic branches of foreign
banks under the CRA umbrella. 99
Representative Maxine Waters (D-Cal.), shortly before adjournment of the last session of Congress in October 1992, introduced yet
another bill to amend the CRA. 300 Among other significant changes,
the proposal would have expanded the type of loans covered by the
HMDA to include small business, personal and consumer loans;
would have expanded the scope of the CRA beyond financial institutions to include private mortgage insurance companies; would have
changed the CRA rating system to a performance based system to
combat what Representative Waters characterizes as "serious grade
inflation" ;301 and would have expanded the public comment period
on CRA ratings. 2
296. Id. § 2 (proposing the addition of § 809, amending the Community Reinvestment

Act of 1977).
297. Id. § 4 (proposing the addition of § 811, amending the Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977).
298. H.R. 5788, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
299. See Annunzio Unleashes Movement to Force Foreign Branches to Comply with CRA,
REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Aug. 17, 1992, at 2; see also 138 CONG. REC. H7721 (daily ed.
Aug. 6, 1992) (statement of Rep. Annunzio) (claiming that foreign financial institutions have
low loan to asset ratios and "abandoned" Americans during the credit crunch).
300. H.R. 6206, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Note that this proposal would amend the
HMDA as well.
301. 138 CONG. REC. E3188 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1992) (stating that almost 90% of all
lending institutions receive an outstanding or satisfactory rating).
302. See House Bills Would Amend CRA, Add Requirements on Student Loans, 59 BNA's
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In addition to these proposals aimed specifically at the CRA, a
number of broader regulatory relief proposals, which included CRA
modifications, were introduced. Although some .aspects of these
broader proposals are objectionable, the concept of tying regulatory
relief to a reform of CRA and related statutes appears viable. The
Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1992 was
introduced as Title IV of the Economic Growth Act of 1992.303
That proposal would have eliminated duplicate record-keeping under
the HMDA and FHA.30 4
Later, on June 2, 1992, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) introduced
a broad financial institution regulatory relief package30 5 known as
the Community Bank Regulatory Relief Act of 1992. Upon its introduction, the bill received30 6the endorsement of the Independent Bankers
Association of America.
First, Senator Dole's proposal would have entirely exempted
"small institutions" from CRA compliance. For this purpose, institutions meeting both a geographic test (main office and all branches in
a community of 20,000 or less which is not in a metropolitan statistical area) and an asset test (100 million dollars or less) would have
been exempt. 30 7 Second, the proposal would have created a safe
harbor for certain institutions. Those with recent "satisfactory" or
"outstanding" CRA ratings and assets of 300 million dollars or less
would have been insulated from CRA challenges to deposit facility
applications.30 8
In addition to these CRA modifications, Senator Dole's proposal
addressed the regulatory burden in broader terms. Section 122 of the
FDICIA created broad reporting requirements applicable to small
business and farm lending. This proposal would have exempted institutions with assets of 100 million dollars or less from compliance
with section 122. 309 Also, Senator Dole's proposal addressed the
many differences in the regulations of the various supervisory agencies. It would have required that economic analysis be made of all

BANKING REP. 563 (1992).
303. S. 2217, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
304. Id. § 461.
305. S. 2794, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
306. See Independent Bankers Praise Dole Bills, Vow Support, PR NEWSWIRE, June 2,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR News File.
307. S. 2794 § 101.
308. Id. (proposing the addition of § 809, amending the Community Reinvestment Act of
1977).
309. Id. § 102(a).
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new regulations, 310 and that within two years, all of those regula311
tions be brought into conformity except as required by law.
On June 18, 1992, Representative Douglas Bereuter (R-Neb.)
introduced the Comprehensive Community Bank Burden Reduction
Act of 1992 (the "CCBBRA"). 312 That proposal has been described
as "the Bush administration's first salvo in the impending war to
deregulate financial institutions. 313 The sponsor of the bill believes
that regulation of financial institutions has moved away from concern
about the financial condition of the institution and toward a management of day-to-day business decisions of the institutions.314 Among
the major provisions of the proposal designed to address that concern
are several which would have a direct impact upon mortgage discrimination and community reinvestment:
1. The small businesses and farm loan reporting requirements
enacted by FDICIA would have been repealed.31 5
2. Changes to the CRA: (a) Self certification 31 6 This procedure would have applied only if three conditions were satisfied: the
institution had not been found to have violated the ECOA in the prior
five years; the institution did not have a current CRA rating of
"needs to improve" or "substantial non-compliance"; and the institution had assets of 100 million dollars or less. If the above requirements were met, the institution would then have been permitted to
self-certify its CRA compliance to its supervisory agency. Intentionally false self-certification would have subjected the violator to a ten
year loss of the benefits of this self-certification procedure and a civil
fine. (b) Safe-harbor-An institution with an "outstanding" or "satisfactory" CRA rating would have been immune from a CRA challenge
in connection with an application for a deposit facility. This safe
harbor treatment would hive applied to an institution satisfying the
above self-certification procedures. (c) CRA exemption for certain
banks-Wholesale bank and credit card banks would have been exempted from the CRA. (d) State examination-A regulatory agency
would have been entitled to accept the exam results of an exam con-

310. Id. § 110.
311. Id. § 111.
312. H.R. 5433, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
313. Proposed Bill Would Ease Compliance Burden of Scores of Regs Enacted in Recent
Years, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, July 20, 1992, at 2.
314. Id.
315. H.R. 5433 § 204(a).
316. Id. § 214.
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ducted by a state agency under a state law comparable to the CRA.
(e) Duplicate information-A provision would have been added to the
CRA to coordinate data collection under the HMDA with the CRA.
Specifically, an institution would not have been required to collect
data for CRA purposes if the HMDA required collection of that same
information.
3. Changes to the HMDA 3 17-The HMDA exemption for small
institutions would have been modified. Currently, an institution with
ten million dollars or less in total assets is exempt from the HMDA.
This proposal would have adjusted that threshold dollar amount annually for changes in the consumer price index. Also, the HMDA currently exempts institutions with thirty million dollars or less in total
assets from some (but not all) reporting duties. This proposal would
have eliminated that exemption.
4. Changes to the FHA-The loan application register requirements of the various supervisory agencies under the FHA would have
been amended. Specifically, any data collection duplicating HMDA
requirements would have been prohibited." 8
5. Office of Regulatory Quality-The proposal would have established an Office of Regulatory Quality within each supervisory agen3 19
cy.
6. Uniform regulations-All supervisory agencies, within two
years, would have been required to complete a review of all regulations and ensure conformity among all of them to the furthest extent
possible. 20
7. Duty of regulators to minimize regulatory burden-The supervisory agencies would have been required, within six months, to
review regulations to identify those requiring financial institutions to
produce "unnecessary internal written policies." Those regulations
would then be amended to delete any unnecessary requirements. 32'
8. Economic analysis of burden of regulations-The proposal
would have required financial supervisory agencies to make detailed
certifications of the economic impact of any regulations adopted. 32
Subsequent to his introduction of the CCBBRA, on July 2, 1992
Representative Bereuter introduced the Credit Availability and Regu-

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

332(2).
335.
221.
212.
217.
220.
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latory Relief Act of 1992 (the "CARRA"). 323 On that same date,
Senator Gain (R-Utah) introduced a proposal bearing the same. name
in the Senate.324 Many aspects of the CARRA are relevant to mortgage discrimination and community reinvestment:
1. CRA amendments. 325 (a) Self certification-This provision is
similar in scope to section 214 of the CCBBRA. However, a financial
institution would have been required to be located in a community of
20,000 or less which is not part of a metropolitan statistical area (in
addition to the CCBBRA provision) in order to qualify. If an institution did qualify, a self-certification process similar to that proposed
under the CCBBRA would have applied. However, the CARRA proposed that the size of the institution as well as its good faith be mitigating factors in assessing any penalty for intentionally submitting
false information to the regulators. (b) Safe harbor-The CARRA
proposed a safe harbor similar to that proposed by the CCBBRA. In
contrast to the CCBBRA, however, only an "outstanding" CRA rating
would have insulated a financial institution from a CRA challenge to
a deposit facility application. Furthermore, the CARRA would have
added a special test for holding company applications which would
have insulated those applications from CRA challenge if subsidiaries
representing two-thirds of the assets in dollar amount had received
"outstanding" ratings while all other subsidiaries received at least
"satisfactory" ratings. Also, the provision insulating self-certified institutions from challenge, which was contained in the CCBBRA, was
dropped in the CARRA. Presumably, the intent of the drafters was to
insulate a self-certified institution as long as the "last" rating it received was "outstanding." (c) State examinations-The CARRA would
have retained the CCBBRA proposal allowing regulators to accept
certain state community reinvestment examinations. (d) Collection of
duplicate information-The CARRA would have retained the
CCBBRA proposal specifying that data required to be collected by
the HMDA need not be collected for CRA purposes. (e) Application
of the CRA to "special purpose" institutions-The CCBBRA proposed
that "wholesale institutions" and "credit card" banks be exempted

323. H.R. 5539, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(a) (1992).
324. S. 2967, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprinted in 138 CoNG. REC. S9813-18 (daily
ed. July 2, 1992); see also Senate Banking Panel Says Bush Bill Would Hurt Distressed
Urban Communities, 59 BNA's BANKING REP. 391 (1992) (reporting on the opposition to the
Bush Administration proposal by the Senate subcommittee headed by Sen. Alan Cranston (DCal.)).
325. S. 2967 § 110.
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from the CRA. The CARRA takes a different approach to that problem. Specifically, the CARRA proposed that "special purpose banks"
(defined as banks that do not generally accept retail deposits such as
credit card banks and trust banks) be evaluated for CRA purposes in
a way that is "consistent with the specific nature of such banks. 326
(f) Additionally, the CARRA would have added an evaluation factor
applicable to all financial institutions. This provision would have required regulators to look favorably upon credit extended in any "distressed community" (even if outside the delineated community of that

bank).
2. HMDA amendments 327-- This provision of the 328
CARRA is
substantially the same as section 332(2) of the CCBBRA.
3. Regulatory burden: (a) Small business/farm lending 32 9--The
CARRA would have repealed section 122 and 477 of the FDICIA.
These are the small business and farm loan reporting requirements
enacted by the FDICIA. This is the same approach proposed by section 204 of the CCBBRA. However, the CARRA goes beyond the
CCBBRA in this area. The CARRA would have required the supervisory agencies to complete a study and report to Congress within one
year on alternate means and methods of obtaining such information.
(b) Uniform regulations-The CARRA took an approach similar to
that of the CCBBRA with respect to uniform regulations. However,
the CARRA would have permitted variation among regulations as required by law and as necessary to protect compelling public interests. 330 (c) Duplicate reporting-The CARRA would have prohibited, in a manner similar to section 335 of the CCBBRA, regulations
under the FHA requiring collection of data identical to that required
to be collected by the HMDA.331
Some key provisions of the CCBBRA were not included in the
CARRA. Specifically, the mandate for an economic analysis of all
regulations and the establishment of Offices of Regulatory Quality
were left out.
Late in the second session of the 102d Congress, Representative

326. Id.
327. Id. § 222.
328. However, the CARRA did not propose, as the CCBBRA did, that the limited

exemption from reporting requirements for institutions having $30,000,000 or less in assets be
deleted. Id.
329. JId§ 103(a).

330. Id § 104(b).
331.

Id.
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Thomas E. Petri introduced a proposal which would have radically
altered the supervision structure of the nation's financial institutions,
and therefore, the laws and regulations applicable to mortgage discrimination. 3 2 The proposal, if ultimately enacted, would be radical
in that it would substitute private management for the existing deposit
insurance system. The proposed system would "create a 100 percent
cross-guarantee system under which each bank or thrift institution will
enter into a contract with an ad hoc syndicate of banks, thrifts, pension or endowment funds, insurance companies and the like to guarantee all of its deposits. 333 This system was introduced in response
to what its sponsor characterizes as an "indiscriminate" federal government response to recent problems among banks and thrifts with the
result that "the regulatory pendulum has swung to an unjustifiable
extreme, and the economy is paying the price."" If this proposal
were enacted, the financial institutions now subject to the CRA would
presumably be taken outside the scope of the CRA because they
would no longer be regulated institutions as defined in the CRA.335
IV. EXTENT OF MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

1990 HMDA Data

The initial public disclosure in 1990 of the expanded HMDA
data (the "Preliminary FRB Report") 336 was striking in a number of
respects. First, the sheer volume of the data was overwhelming.337
Second, the disparities between the loan approval rates for whites and

332. H.R. 6069, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprinted in 138 CONG. REC. E2969-96
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992). The bill was titled The Taxpayer Protection, Deposit Insurance
Reform and Regulatory Relief Act of 1992.
333. 138 CONG. REc. E2969 (statement of Rep. Thomas E. Petri introducing the proposal).
334. Id.
335. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(2) (1992). Note that H.R. 6069 would abolish the FFIEC. H.R.

6069 § 146.
336. Glen B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded
Data on Residential Lending, 77 FED. RESERVE BULL. 859 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary
FRB Report]. The Preliminary FRB Report analyzes the 1990 HMDA data on a nationwide
basis only. Presumably, many analyses considering particular regions of the country will soon
follow. The Preliminary FRB Report was summarized in FRB Issues HMDA Analysis, ABA
BANK COMPLIANCE, Nov. 1991, at 2. Excerpts from the Preliminary FRB Report may also be
located in Excerpts from Fed Study on Bias in Home Lending, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1991,
at 9.
337. Preliminary FRB Report, supra note 336, at 862-63.
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Asians, on the one hand, and blacks and Hispanics, on the other
hand, was shocking.338 Finally, the ability of the supervisory agencies to make conclusive determinations about the extent of prohibited
racial discrimination in the face of this sea of data was perplexing.339 It was perplexing in the sense that the intricate reporting
structure described above, which has consumed so many resources of
financial institutions which would otherwise have been available for
loans, was not designed in a manner which produces the kind of
data that enables the regulators to draw the most basic of conclusions
(i.e., whether prohibited discrimination is taking place).
The volume of the data was significantly increased by the provisions of the FIRREA. The FIRREA increased the number of reporting
institutions, the number of transactions reported by each institution,
and the number of characteristics of each transaction reported. l In
fact, the volume of 1990 HMDA data was approximately eleven times
greater than the HMDA data processed prior to the FIRREA.342
In 1990, 9,281 institutions submitted reports on approximately
6.4 million transactions. This was made up of 5.26 million applications (including approvals and declinations). Most of these applications concerned one to four family dwellings (3.09 million for purchase-money loans, 1.02 million for refinancing, and 1.10 million for
home improvement). The rest of the applications related to multi-family dwellings. The balance of the transactions (the transactions which
were not applications) were sales or purchases of loans.343
The resulting volume of data processed by the FRB exceeded
that of any other single subject handled by the FRB. 4 It has been
humorously suggested that, if all of these reporting institutions had
submitted their reports in paper (as opposed to computerized) format,
the resulting stack of reports would have been higher than the Washington monument."4 Given that this volume of data was submitted

338. See id. at 868-70. In 1990, 14.4% of white applicants for conventional home purchases were denied credit. The rejection rate for black and Hispanic applicants were 33.9%
and 21.4%, respectively. Id.
339. See id. at 881 ("Because of certain limitations (the most important being incomplete
information about applicant's financial characteristics), the expanded data alone cannot provide
the answers to these questions.").
340. See infra note 396 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
342. Preliminary FRB Report, supra note 336, at 862.
343. Id. at 862-63. 867.
344. Id. at 862.
345. Curtain Rises on New HMDA World, ABA BANKING J., Dec. 1991, at 16, 16
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during a weak housing market in the United States, the FRB predicts

that it will increase significantly in later years. 46 It is interesting to
note that, despite this overwhelming volume of data, the Preliminary
FRB Report characterizes the process as "a relatively simple one that
minimizes the burden on the reporting institutions and, at the same
time, provides a reporting format that offers a large base of information for use by the public and the supervisory agencies." 7
The FRB then used this information to prepare disclosure state-

ments on behalf of the FFIEC for transmission to the reporting institutions. This resulted in the distribution of over 1.2 million pages of

printed information.

8

The 1990 HMDA data, as found in these disclosure statements,
was consistent with prior studies" in a number of respects: those
with relatively low incomes are more likely to apply for government
backed loans than those with relatively high incomes;350 black, and
to a lesser extent, Hispanic applicants are more likely to apply for
government backed loans than white or Asian applicants. This pattern
exists1 even when applicant groups are categorized by income lev35
els.

A high percentage of home purchase loan applications are approved, approximately 72.3% in the case of conventional applications,
and 71.7% in the case of applications for government backed
[hereinafter Curtain Rises].
346. Preliminary FRB Report, supra note 336, at 862.
347. Id. at 861-62.
348. Id. at 863.
349. See, e.g., MARGERY A. TURNER & VERONICA M. REED. THE URBAN INSTITUTE,
HOUSING AMERICAN: LEARNING FROM THE PAST, PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE 16 (1991)
("There can be no doubt that the stubborn persistence of racial discrimination plays an important part in perpetuating patrons of market segregation."); Katherine L. Bradburg et al., Geographic Patterns of Mortgage Lending in Boston, 1982-1987, NEw ENG. ECON. REV., Sept.Oct. 1989, at 3. Bradburg concluded that:
From the available data it is not possible to sort out the precise roles played by
lenders, as opposed to buyers, sellers, developers, realtors, appraisers, insurers and
others, in the complex housing and mortgage markets. What is indisputable is that
the ratio of mortgage loans to housing varies by race and this pattern cannot be
fully explained by economic and other non-racial factors.
Id. at 4; see also Mike Doming, Who Gets Home Mortgages Still an Issue of Black and
White, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1990 (Business sec.), at 1; The Color of Money, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., May 1-16, 1988 ("Whites receive five times as many home loans from Atlanta's
banks and savings and loans as blacks of the same income-and the gap has been widening
each year."); see generally Preliminary FRB Report, supra note 336, at 863-66 (citing various
studies on lending discrimination); S. REP. No. 167, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 86-89 (1991).
350. Preliminary FRB Report, supra note 336, at 867.
351. See id.
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loans. 352 However, the rejection rate is greater for black and Hispanic applicants than for white or Asian applicants. Specifically, approximately 12.9% of Asian applicants, and 14.4% of white applicants
were turned down for conventional financing as compared to turn
down rates of approximately 21.4% for Hispanic applicants, and
33.9% for black applicants.353 Furthermore, this same pattern holds
true even when applicant groups are categorized by income levels.
For example, when grouped in the lowest income, category, 17.2% of
Asians, 23.1% of whites, 31.1% of Hispanics, and 40.1% of blacks
were turned down.3 4 When grouped in the highest income category,
11.2% of Asians, 8.5% of whites, 15.8% of Hispanics, and 21.4% of
blacks were turned down. Similar rejection patterns are reflected by
the data applicable to government backed loans. 55
Accordingly, the 1990 HMDA data caused regulators, the financial institutions, and the public to ask the same two questions which
have been presented for years: (1) are regulated lenders meeting their
CRA duties to low and moderate income areas of their community,
and (2) are mortgage lenders impermissibly discriminating on the
basis of race?
The Preliminary FRB Report then went to great length to emphasize that the HMDA data did not conclusively establish the exis35 6
tence of impermissible racial discrimination in mortgage lending.
The primary reason that the FRB took this stance is the absence of
certain key pieces of information concerning prospective borrowers
and their proposed collateral from the required HMDA data. For
example, the Preliminary FRB Report emphasized the lack of information concerning the creditworthiness of individual applicants and

352. Id. at 868.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 870.
355. Id. at 870-71.
356. See id. at 873-76. 881; see also Mortgage Discrimination Hearings 1, supra note 1,
at 4-6 (comments of John P. LaWare, member of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System concerning inconclusiveness of the Federal Reserve's study of mortgage
lending discrimination, prepared pursuant to FIRREA concerns of deliberate discrimination);
John P. LaWare, Do Lenders Discriminate?, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEws, Feb. 17, 1992, at 4
(comments of Mr. LaWare upon the FRB report concerning the 1990 HMDA data). There is
significant debate over the existence of a negative correlation between racial composition of
neighborhoods and private sector investment in those neighborhoods in the form of mortgages.
Compare Richard C. Hula, Neighborhood Development and Local Credit Markets, URB. AFP.
Q., Dec. 1991, at 249 with Anne B. Shlay et al., Racial Barriers to Credit: Comment on
Hula, URB. AFF. Q., Sept. 1992, at 12. See also Richard C. Hula, A Brief Response to
Shlay, Goldstein and Bartelt, URB. AFF. Q., Sept. 1992, at 141.
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concerning the appropriateness of the valuations of particular parcels
offered as collateral.

7

Industry sources also widely criticized allegations of racial discrimination based on the 1990 HMDA data. One criticism was that
the data made institutions who worked the hardest to lend in low and
moderate income areas of their community look the worst. This allegedly occurs when a financial institution, in order to meet its CRA
duties, aggressively markets its services to the low and moderate
income areas of its community. If the marketing is effective, a high
number of low and moderate income applicants are attracted, but
many are turned down for financial reasons such as poor credit history, unstable employment history, high debt-to-income ratio, and insuf-

ficient collateral. As a result, the HMDA data show a high rejection
rate for these applicants.35

Others criticized 1990 HMDA data as containing technical errors.
For example, one news report indicated that a major lender had determined that its report failed to include data concerning home improvement loans.359

The FRB was criticized by some members of Congress for taking this position concerning the inconclusiveness of the HMDA data. 360 In fact, that criticism included charges that the FRB was ac361
tively attempting to shield the lenders from criticism.

As had been widely predicted, the release of the 1990 HMDA

data prompted nine major regulatory responses. 3 62 The various agen-

357. Preliminary FRB Report, supra note 336, at 875-76; see also Paul H. Schieber,
Minority Lending Needs To Be Better Understood: Federal Reserve Board Study a Starting
Point, MAG. OF BANK MGMr., Jan. 1992, at 56. The additional factors described in that
article are employment stability (disproportionately hampers minority applicants), family assets
(generally lower for black families than for white families), income (generally lower for black
families than for whites), appraisals, secondary market guidelines, quality of housing stack
offered by the loan applicants, and the impact of the actions of third parties (such as real
estate agents). Id. at 56-57.
358. Nora M. Brownell, End the Catch-22 in Minority Lending, AM. BANKER, May 29,
1992, at 4; James P. Scanlan, Bias Data Can Make the Good Look Bad, Am. BANKER, Apr.
27, 1992, at 4.
359. See Curtain Rises, supra note 345, at 20.
360. E.g., Banks Taking Heat on Study Addressing Minority Loan Denials, BANKING
POL'Y REP., Nov. 4, 1991, at 5 (reporting Rep. Kennedy's objections to FRB "spin control"
on 1990 HMDA data).
361. Another criticism of the regulators in their response to the 1990 HMDA data has
been that those trying to deal with the problem are largely white and male. Largely White,
Male Regulators in Spotlight for Overlooking Race, Sex Discrimination, REG. COMPLIANCE
VATCH, June 15, 1992, at 4.
362. See Fair Lending: Implications of the Recent Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data:
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cies responsible for supervision of financial agencies uniformly indicated that compliance with fair lending laws would receive increased
attention in the examination process. 36 3 The agencies commenced in-

vestigations of specific lenders suspected of fair lending law viola-

tions, 36' began considering the referral of some cases to the Department of Justice, 365 launched additional studies, 366 and provided
lenders with additional information in an attempt to broaden the understanding of the fair lending laws.3 67 An example of this increased

regulatory attention to lending discrimination is the major role that
the CRA is playing in the approval process for mergers involving
financial institutions. 368 In addition, a project aimed at identifying
those violating the fair lending laws through the use of testers, a con370
cept rejected by the M ,369 has been announced by HUD.

Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development and the
Subcommittee 'on Consumer Affairs and Coinage of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (statement of Lawrence B. Lindsey
concerning enforcement improvement due to 1990 HMDA data), available in FED. REsERVE
BULL., July 1992, at 500; John P. LaWare, Statement before the Committee on Banks of the
New York State Assembly (Jan. 22, 1992), in 78 FED. RESERVE BULL. 193, 193-95 (1992)
(describing limitations on data).
363. See The Memo to Chief Executive Officers and Directors of National Banks and All
Examining Personnel from the Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision Policy, available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, OCCBJ file (Dec. 11, 1991); CRA Examinations Enhanced
in Wake of Latest HMDA Data, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, June 1, 1992, at 1.
364. See Fed Expects Clearer Picture on HMDA by Computer Analysis of Lending
Patterns, 59 BNA's BANKING REP. 242 (1992); HMDA Data Force Regulators to Search for
Discrimination; Tougher Examinations, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, June 1, 1992, at 1. Clark
H. Nielsen, Regulators Look for Racial Bias in Lending, MAG. OF BANK MGMT.. July 1992,
at 16.
365. Phil Roosevelt, Justice Dept. is Probing Loan Bias at Banks. AM. BANKER, May 29,
1992, at 1.
366. See Federal Financial Regulators Conducting HMDA Follow-Up Study, 59 BNA's
BANKING REP. 863 (1992); Phil Roosevelt, Banks Facing a Heat Wave on Loan Bias, AM.
BANKER, June 5, 1992, at 1.
367. Comptroller of the Currency, Guide to Fair Mortgage Lending, BANKING BULL. 9217, Mar. 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, OCCBJ file (outlining a "preventive approach for financial institutions to help ensure compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and the Fair Housing Act (FHA)").
368. See CRA Protests Highlight Regulatory Actions During Second Quarter, BANKING
POL'Y REp., Aug. 5, 1991, at 8; Philip C. Meyer, CRA, Not Antitrust, Is Key Regulatory
Factor in Initial Megamergers, BANKING POL'Y REP., Jan. 6, 1992, at 1.
369. See Current Evidence Inconclusive About Lending Discrimination, Fed Will Not Use
Testers, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH. Oct. 4, 1991, at 1; Robert M. Garsson, 'Testers' for
Loan Bias in Banks Would Be Required by Kennedy, AM. BANKER, Oct. 29, 1991, at I.
370. 57 Fed. Reg. 30,499 (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 21,127 (1992); see also HUD's Discriminatory Lending Testing Project Is Slightly Revised, Extended, BNA BANKING DAILY, July 13,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNABD File; Loan Bias Probes Initiated at HUD
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B.

1991 HMDA Data

The 1991 HMDA Data was recently released. Although there are
7
disagreements over the interpretation of HMDA data for 1991,1 1
community organizations claim that the 1991 data shows little change
from the 1990 data. 372
C.

Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study

The City of Boston recently released a study on mortgage lending discrimination in the Boston, Massachusetts area.373 The major
conclusion of that study should be considered in detail because it
refutes the argument that race-based discrimination is not a significant
factor in race-based disparities in loan approval rates. The authors of
that study concluded:
The results of this study indicate that race does play a role as
lenders consider whether to deny or approve a mortgage loan application. The impact of race is substantially less than indicated by the

and Justice, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, June 1992, at 1.
371. E.g., Claudia Cummins, Riegle: Congress Will Crack Down on Loan Bias if Regulators Don't, AM. BANKER, Oct. 29, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Cummins, Loan Bias] (summarizing
results of the Consumer Bankers Association study); 1991 HMDA Data Still Shows Racial
Disparities on Loan Approvals, Denials, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 28, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNABD File (reporting the Consumer Bankers Association claims that
the 1991 data does not reflect results of efforts made in 1991 by lenders). The second annual
release of expanded HMDA data took place recently. Many lenders are taking the position
that significant improvements have been made since the date of the first release of that
expanded date in late 1991. However, regulators and community organizations, despite conceding some improvement, do not generally agree with that characterization. See, e.g., New
Survey Gaps in HMDA Data, Shows Commitment by Bankers, CBA Says, 59 BNA's BANKING REF. 629 (1992); Phil Roosevelt, 4 Giants Fail to Narrow Gap in Minority Lending, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 23, 1992, at 1; see also Claudia Cummins, Acorn Says Mortgage Bias Has
Not Abated, AM. BANKER, Oct. 2, 1992, at 8 [hereinafter Cummins, Mortgage Bias]. For a
description of some of the efforts by lenders in response to the 1990 HMDA data, see
Wendy Pelle, Banks Try to Increase Minority Loans, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct. 19,
1992, at 17 (efforts of many banks include downpayment assistance, flexible underwriting
standards, funds targeted toward low and moderate income persons, marketing aimed at
minorities, educational efforts, and partnerships with declined applications).
372. Brian Collins & Ted Cornwell, HMDA Data: Disparities Still Remain, NAT'L
MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct. 5, 1992, at 10 (reporting that the Association of Community Organizations For Reform Now has "issued a report charging that this year's data show little
change"); Claudia Cummins, Fed Reports Little Change in Loan Bias, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28,
1992, at 1 (the FRB reported, for example, that the denial rate for blacks was 2.17 times
higher than the rate for whites in 1991 as compared to 2.35 times higher in 1990).
373. ALIciA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING
HMDA DATA (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 92-97, 1992).
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original 1990 HMDA data, which showed black and Hispanic applicants for mortgages in the Boston metropolitan area in 1990 were
turned down at a rate 2.7 times that for white applicants. As it turns
out, the higher denial rate for minorities in Boston is accounted for,
in large part, by their having higher loan-to-value ratios and weaker
credit histories than whites. They are also more likely to be trying
to purchase a two- to four-unit property rather than a single-family
home. Nevertheless, after taking account of such factors a substantial gap remains.
A black or Hispanic applicant in the Boston area is roughly 60
percent more likely to be denied a mortgage loan than a similarly
situated white applicant. This means that 17 percent of black or
Hispanic applicants instead of 11 percent would be denied loans,
even if they had the same obligation ratios, credit history, loan to
value, and property characteristics as white applicants. In short, the
results indicate that a serious problem exists in the market for mortgage loans, and lenders, community groups, and regulators must
work together to ensure that minorities are treated fairly. 74
This study was undertaken in direct response to the 1990 HMDA
data." The study sought to correct some of the inadequacies in the
HMDA data, including lack of information about factors such as
credit and employment history and property characteristics.3 76 Although the results of the study are more favorable to lenders than the
1990 HMDA .data viewed alone, the results do not exonerate lenders
of claims of racial discrimination.37 7 On a more positive note, the

374. Id. at 43-44.
375. See Claudia Cummins, Boston Fed Study Finds Loan Bias Exaggerated, but Still

Significant, AM. BANKER, Oct. 9, 1992. at 1, 1 ("The study took a comprehensive look at
many variables that affect mortgage lenders' decisions in the Boston area, seeking to isolate
when race appeared to be the key factor in rejections."); Minority Loan Applicants: RaceBased Loan Disparity Persists, According to New Study by Boston Fed., BNA BANKING
DAunY, Oct. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNABD File (reporting that the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, in conducting the study, collected data on 1,200 conventional mortgage loan applications by blacks and Hispanics, and 3,300 by whites in the Boston
metropolitan area).
376. See Race-Based Loan Disparity Persists, According to New Study by Boston Fed, 59
BNA's BANKING REP. 59 (1992) (reporting that the study took thirty-eight factors into
account).

377. Although the study found that minority applicants had, on average, higher debt bur-

dens, higher loan-to-value ratios, and weaker credit histories, those factors alone did not
account fully for the difference in acceptance rates between black and white applicants. The

researchers concluded that only race could account for the remaining difference in acceptance
rates. Cummins, Loan Bias, supra note 371, at 1; see also Impending 1991 HMDA Data
Give Lenders Reason to Worry, REG. COMPULmANCE WATCH, Oct. 26, 1992, at 1 (reporting on
a recent New York State Banking Commission study reaching similar conclusions). But see
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statistical model developed by researchers in conducting the study
may. provide lenders and regulators with a tool to detect the existence
378
of discrimination in the lending practices of particular institutions.
V. Regulatory Burden on Financial Institutions
Piece by piece, the above-described puzzle of regulations applicable to the wide range of activities engaged in by United States financial institutions, including mortgage lending, has been assembled.

Unfortunately, when one steps back to look at the puzzle it is simply
not possible to see the big picture clearly.379

One of the major contributing factors in this lack of clarity is
the continual change in the pieces constituting the puzzle. In an attempt to understand the reasons for this anomalous situation and to
formulate a recipe for a cure, the American Bankers Association
commissioned and funded a study which was completed in 1989.380
That study found the regulatory structure to be growing rapidly and
identified the simple fact of continuous change as the single greatest

Gary S. Becker, The Evidence Against Banks Doesn't Prove Bias, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1993,

at 18.
378. See Claudia Cummins, Boston Fed Study Offers Tool to Search Out Mortgage Bias,
Am. BANKER, Oct. 19, 1992, at 1.
379. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 242' (concerning the regulatory burden study
required by the FDICIA).
380. The results of this study are summarized by Allie Buzzell, The Burden of Bank
Regulation: A Synopsis of the Study, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, July/Summer 1990, at 5. This
American Bankers Association study was preceded by a study of the burden of regulation on
six major economic sectors, one of these sectors being banking, conducted by the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and completed in 1977. That study concluded that
imprecise mandates from Congress, overlap and duplication of agency responsibilities, and
lack of effective oversight of the agency operations were the main sources of the burdens of
the regulatory system on banks. It recommended that a single banking oversight agency be
formed to replace the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board.
Id. at 8. Another study preceding the 1989 American Bankers Association study was conducted in 1979 for the Business Roundtable by Arthur Andersen & Co. Three of the forty-eight
companies included were large banks. The study identified a series of factors which cause the
incremental cost of compliance with regulations to be high. These incremental costs are high
when the regulation either requires or results in one of the following: continuous monitoring,
new technology, new or modified equipment, recurring operation or maintenance costs,
modifications (as opposed to adjustments) in existing facilities, lack of flexibility in permissible methods of compliance, a stringent standard, engineering solutions necessary because
compliance is not yet possible, and when frequent adaptations are required. Id. Finally, in
1984 a task force led by then Vice President George Bush released a report titled Blueprint
for Reform: The Report of the Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services. The task
force identified problems in the banking regulatory structure such as outdated requirements,
vague legislative mandates, jurisdictional overlap, and inconsistent policy directives. Id.
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source of burden upon financial institutions.38' Bankers, as a result,
are pushing for legislation to ease the regulatory burden. 382 In that

effort, some bankers claim that the burden has become so severe as
to threaten the financial viability of the banking industry.383

A distressing result of the continually growing regulatory structure is the enormous cost of compliance, or attempted compliance.3"4 The American Bankers Association conducted a survey of
banks concerning the regulatory burden, 38 5 and received responses
from 974 banks.38 6

One survey question requiring a written response asked bankers
to identify specific regulatory problems which could be eliminated by

changes in regulation. 3' Responses to this question were received
from 529 survey participants. The CRA was mentioned by 69% of
those responding to this question. This was the most commonly identified problem area. The second highest percentage, 12.3%, identified
consumer protection rules, including the HMDA and FHA. The seventh highest percentage, 4.9%, identified the ECOA.388
This concern with the CRA extended to other aspects of the

survey. The CRA was the most frequently cited regulation in the
"most time consuming for CEOs" category, 389 the "regulations giving CEOs most headaches" category, 390 and the "most time consuming for bank complaint managers/officers" category.39'

381. Buzzell, supra note 380, at 11.
382. Barbara A. Rehm, War on Red Tape Moves to the Home Front, AM. BANKER, Aug.
5, 1992, at 1.
383. See Giowing Paperwork Burden Is Under Scrutiny by Congress; Regulators Sympathize, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, July 6, 1992, at 1 (reporting on comments of FDIC Chairman William Taylor).
384. See ABA Banks Spent $10.7 Billion in Compliance Costs in 1991, ABA Industry
Survey Shows, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 18. 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BNABD File; Bank Compliance Costs Equal More than Half of Industry Profits, BANKING
POL'Y REP., July 6, 1992, at 5; Banks Spent $10.7 Billion in Compliance Costs in 1991, an
ABA Survey Estimates, 58 BNA's BANKING REP. 1086 (1992); Barbara A. Rehm, ABA: Cost
of Compliance Equals 59% of Bank Profits, AM. BANKER, June 18, 1992, at 1; Barbara A.
Rehm, Banks Spent More than $3 Billion on Compliance in '91, Survey Finds, AM. BANKER,
June 8, 1992, at 1.
385.

RESULTS
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, SURVEY OF REGULATORY BURDEN: SUMMARY OF

(1992).
l at C-2.
Id. at B-9.

Id.
Id at C-9.
Id. at C-12.
391. Id. at C-15.
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The survey results point out a troubling gap between the perceptions of regulators and the experience of bankers. In a 1991 article, a
member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
characterized the CRA burden as follows: "Even with these changes,
the CRA's actual legal requirements are relatively few in number and
quite straightforward. And, most important, the burden of these legal
requirements still falls on the bank supervisory agencies. '392
At the time of adopting the CRA, Congress did not believe that
it would impose a significant regulatory burden on financial institutions. The Senate Report of its version of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 stated: "The question of whether the bill
will increase the regulatory burden on financial institutions was thoroughly considered by the Committee. The Committee believes that the
regulatory agencies already have sufficient data to393carry out the intent
of this act without requiring additional red-tape."
Based on these survey responses, the AmeriCan Bankers Association reported that the industry had spent 10.7 billion dollars in 1991
on regulatory compliance. This amounts, according to American
Bankers Association computations,
to fifty-nine percent of bank in39 4
dustry profits during 1991.
Computation of compliance costs is, obviously, a difficult matter.
Furthermore, these compliance cost estimates must be viewed with
caution since they are based on figures submitted by banks themselves to the trade organization representing those banks. However,
the American Bankers Association claims that the 10.7 billion dollar
figure is actually low because it fails to include amounts such as the
cost of complying with the banking legislation enacted in 1991.
The American Bankers Association survey also fails to account
for the impact of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 on the
regulatory burden. Regulators have already made it clear that the

392. John P. LaWare, A CRA Report Card: How Are Lenders Doing, J. COMMERCIAL
BANK LENDING, April 1991, at 6. Even 10 years after the adoption of the CRA, commentators did not view the record-keeping aspects of CRA to be a significant burden on financial
institutions. See Art, supra note 2, at 1088 ("The record-keeping and mechanical requirements
of the regulations are quite limited and not significantly burdensome."); see also id. at 1105,
1135.
393. S. REP. No. 175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1977). Contrast these views to the
additional views of Senators Morgan, Tower, Gain, Lugar, and Schmitt that "the bill as
reported would not only add a tremendous amount of paperwork for our already overburdened
financial institutions, but would also have the adverse effect of causing a reduction in credit
availability in these areas which we are trying so desperately to revitalize." Id. at 81.
394. AMERICAN BANKERS AssocATioN, supra note 385, at A-2.
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burden of compliance with the ADA may well exceed the CRA compliance burden.395

Why are these costs estimates "distressing"? A major reason is
the fact that the money being expended on this regulatory compliance
would otherwise be available for loans. The American Bankers Association estimates that an additional twenty to thirty billion dollars per

year would be available for lending if only one-quarter of the money
now being expended by banks upon regulatory compliance could be

redirected to capital.396
The regulators, as well as the regulated institutions, have expressed significant concern over the growing regulatory burden.397
Although recognizing the special nature of the responsibility of finan-

cial institutions to society, regulators have expressed concern that this
regulatory burden is placing the financial institution industry at a
competitive disadvantage3 98 and is falling disproportionately on
smaller institutions.399 Although regulators are currently in the midst

of programs and studies designed to minimize this burden'4 00 they
believe legislation will be needed to adequately address the problem.4 '
VI. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Any one piece of banking legislation will, standing alone, not

make a significant dent in existing racial disparities in home mortgage

395. Disabilities Act More Onerous than CRA, Regulators Say, REG. COMPLIANCE
WATCH, Mar. 2, 1992, at 1, 1; FDIC, OCC to Step Up Examinations; More Scrutiny of
Compliance Matters, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Feb. 24, 1992, at 3 ("[A]II the regulations
that are going to have to be promulgated to comply with this new law are overwhelming and
...regulators are just now beginning to understand the vastness of compliance and enforcement problems that they are going to create.").
396. Alan R. Tubbs, Statement on Behalf of the American Bankers Association Before
the Federal Financial Institutions Council 3 (June 18, 1992) (transcript on file with Hofstra
Law Review).
397. John P. LaWare, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
(June 23, 1992), reprinted in 78 FED. RESERVE BULL. 607 (1992).

398. L at 608.
399. Id at 609.
400. Id at 609-10 (stating that an FRB program to minimize regulatory burden has been
in place since 1978; the FFIEC mission is to ensure consistency among agencies; the FRB is
participating with other regulatory agencies in a "Regulatory Uniformity Project" that has goal
of promoting consistency and reducing regulatory burden; and the FFIEC is required under
§ 221 of the FDICIA to review procedures of its member agencies in order to identify
unnecessary burdens); see also Banking Agencies Move to Ensure Uniformity in Interpretations of Significant Legal Issues, THRiFr REGULATOR, Sept. 28, 1992, at 4.

401. LaWare, supra note 397, at 610.
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lending. That will occur only as education changes attitudes now
causing people to use race as a determining factor in their dealings
with others. Nonetheless, an improvement in the current statutory
structure-a change which simplifies and provides incentives-has the
potential to provide some relief from the current regulatory burden
and also decrease the amount of mortgage discrimination.
In crafting this statutory improvement, there is a temptation to
create more governmental agencies with oversight authority, and to
require existing agencies to conduct further studies to get to the root
of the problem. Those approaches should be avoided given the large
number of agencies already in existence and the overwhelming number of studies already completed.
Given the continuation of discrimination in the face of a statutory structure which has been largely in place for over two decades,
another temptation is to throw out the existing structure and begin
anew. This approach is to be avoided as well. If aggressive enforcement focusing on substance rather than form is undertaken, thi§ existing structure provides a solid foundation for positive change. It is not
time to throw out the good with the bad and require a complete
retooling by lenders, regulators, and community organizations.
Instead, the suggested approach is a refinement of the existing
structure in a manner which will be seen as positive by lenders, regulators, and community organizations. To the extent that all of these
groups view the structure as substantive and positive rather than technical and negative, the likelihood of change is enhanced. This approach would not address any single piece of the statutory structure
in isolation. Instead, the FHA, ECOA, HMDA, CRA, and ADA are
treated as complementary elements of a structure designed to eliminate discriminatory lending practices, a structure which must be administered in a unified manner.
In striving for uniform application, this approach would not
attempt to distinguish among regulated financial institutions based on
the institution's assets or the populations of the communities in which
they operate. All financial institutions, regardless of size or location,
have a special duty to the community based upon special rights conferred upon those institutions by law. Accordingly, this approach
would be a functional one, requiring that the various statutes be applied in light of the purpose of the particular institution.
The first element of this proposal involves conduct of financial
institutions which is required (other than data collection) or prohibited
by the various statutes and accompanying regulations. In many cases,
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particularly in the case of smaller institutions, compliance may well
be adversely affected by the staggering nature of the task of simply
locating the various statutes and regulations. In this case, Reg. B
could serve as a model, a single regulation that applies to all regulated financial institutions. The proposed statute would first require that
a single regulation be drafted by the FFIEC (and adopted by the various regulating agencies) implementing the anti-discrimination, notice,
and record retention requirements of the FHA, ECOA, and ADA as
they apply to regulated financial institutions.
The second element of this proposal is that the Bank Enterprise
Act component of the FDICIA be funded. This would provide incentives for compliance.4 2
The third element of this proposal would unify the scattered,
inconsistent data collection requirements of the FHA, ECOA, HMDA,
CRA, and FDICIA (and the ADA, to the extent that any similar data
collection requirements are added). Specifically: (a) Any lender satisfying the data collection requirements of the HMDA should be
deemed to satisfy the data collection requirements of the FHA. (b)
Any lender satisfying the data collection requirements of the HMDA
should be deemed to satisfy the data collection requirements of the
CRA with respect to that lender's particular loans covered by HMDA.
(c) Sections 122 and 477 of the FDICIA40 3 should be repealed and
the CRA should be amended to require that lenders subject to the
CRA collect data on "small business" and "small farm" loan applications, organizations and purchases in the same format as required for
loans covered by the HMDA. The terms "small business" and "small
farm" should be defined (in contrast to the approach taken by the
FDICIA) in line with the purpose of the loan and the total asset size
of the borrower as stated by the borrower on the application. "Geocoding" of types of credit beyond that required by the HMDA and
these "small business" and "small farm" loan provisions should not
be mandated. (d) All of the mandatory data collection requirements
should require information about the borrower's creditworthiness,
employment and salary history, debt-to-income ratio, and value of
collateral to be collected in order that more accurate conclusions may

402. A technical corrections provision should be considered to clarify the drafting of the
Bank Enterprise Act. See supra notes 249-61 and accompanying text.
403. Although not a central element of this proposal, the appraisal amendment to the
ECOA under § 233 of the FDICIA should be statutorily clarified. See supra notes 235-41
and accompanying text.
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be drawn from the data collected.
The fourth element of this proposal would make a basic modification to the CRA. The overall intent of this modification would be
to meet community demands to hold lenders accountable for their
records of meeting community credit needs, while providing incentives for lenders with outstanding records. It is proposed that a series
of presumptions based upon a lender's CRA rating be created. These
presumptions would apply to CRA challenges to deposit facility applications. A lender with an "outstanding" rating would be entitled to an
irrebuttable presumption in favor of the application on CRA grounds.
A lender with a "satisfactory" rating would receive a rebuttable presumption in favor of the application. A lender with a "needs to improve" rating would face a rebuttable presumption against the application on CRA grounds. A lender with a "substantial noncompliance"
rating would be subject to an irrebuttable presumption against the
application on CRA grounds.
The fifth element of this proposal would modify section 806 of
the CRA, which authorizes the various supervisory agencies to adopt
regulations implementing the CRA. Although positive changes are
already being implemented in this respect, this change would statutorily require the regulatory agencies to incorporate the following
concepts into the CRA regulations: (a) the rating must be based on
performance, not documentation; (b) the rating must take into account,
both in terms of documentation and performance, the asset size of the
institution and the size of its community; and (c) the rating must take
into account any restrictions imposed on the activities of the organizations by the terms of its charter.'
The final element of this proposal goes beyond the mortgage
discrimination law. Regulatory uniformity among the various supervisory agencies with respect to all regulations within a one year period
should be statutorily mandated. Deviations would be permitted only to
the extent required to comply with the applicable law.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Somewhere along the road to solving the problem of mortgage

404. See Gary M. Welsh, The Community Bank Charter: An Option for Regulatory
Reform, BANKING POL'Y REP., Sept. 7, 1992, at 1, 16 (arguing for creation of a limited
charter which would leave community banks receiving that charter "fully subject to all antidiscrimination laws" but would exempt them from the CRA "because, by definition, they will
be concentrated on serving local community credit needs").
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discrimination in the United States, a road paved with good intentions, the "solution" took on a life of its own. The solution, rather
than the underlying problem, appears to have become the focus. 4 5
It is, of course, not possible to eradicate mortgage discrimination
through any system of laws alone. Until the underlying social problems are addressed, any legal solution is doomed to failure. However,
it is time to modify that legal system in order that it will be poised
to assist in solving the problem as these underlying social problems
are addressed.
This Article is not an argument for making the laws applicable
to mortgage discrimination more lax. However, it is time to recognize
that the existing structure has simply not worked well. Accordingly,
alternative approaches must be explored.
The first step in solving the problem of mortgage discrimination
is to make the structure of the current laws prohibiting mortgage
discrimination less complex. This includes incorporating the various
laws regulating mortgage discrimination into a single, comprehensible,
and consistent format.4°6 To the extent that the structure is overly
complex, the likelihood of compliance is decreased. The second step
is to make the reporting requirements less burdensome. The excessively burdensome system currently in place appears to be decreasing
confidence in the system and to be diverting precious resources away
from real solutions. The third step is to create tangible rewards and
penalties for lenders based on their community reinvestment records.
The fourth step is to create incentives for lenders to invest in financially distressed areas of the United States.' °7 The fifth and final
step is to assure overall uniformity in bank regulation to the extent
reasonably possible.

405. Debra Cope, Fed Consumer Panel: Loan Bias Exists, and Something Must be Done,
AM. BANKER, June 15, 1992, at 6, 6 ("A panel of advisers to the Federal Reserve Board has
urged bankers and regulators to quit arguing about whether loan bias exists, and get on with
the job of eliminating it.").
406. See Barbara A. Rehm, Activists Warn Banks that Campaign to Ease CRA Rules
Might Backfire, AM. BANKER, June 29, 1992, at 1, 6-7.
407. FDIC Willing to Evaluate CRA Rating System, Taylor Pledges, 58 BNA's BANKING
REP. 765 (1992) (reporting on recommendations to reward banks with outstanding CRA
ratings in an amount equal to penalties assessed against non-complying institutions).
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